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When Rights Don't Talk: Abortion Law and the
Politics of Compromise
Noya Rimaltt
ABSTRACT: This Article draws attention to the significance of rights-talk in
shaping proper abortion legislation. It engages with ongoing debates regarding
the wisdom of Roe v. Wade's judicially imposed, strict rights-based approach to
legal abortion. As the issue of abortion remains extremely controversial in Amer-
ican politics, it has been argued that the Supreme Court's rights-based rhetoric,
coupled with its "undemocratic" judicial imposition of a resolution to the issue,
played a central role in triggering the ongoing conflict over abortion. Legal schol-
ars often rely on comparative examples in an attempt to argue in favor of legis-
lative and conciliatory policy solutions to the issue of abortion.
This Article questions the superiority of legislative solutions to abortion by
providing a critical comparative account of abortion legislation that seems to ex-
emplify precisely the sort of compromise-based solution advocated by critics of
Roe v. Wade's judicially created right to abortion. It critically analyzes the give-
and-take process in the Israeli legislature that gave birth to the country's abortion
law. The Article argues that the Israeli case study provides a cautionary tale of a
legal system in which abortion regulation was decided exclusively by legislators,
rather than judges, which resulted in legislation devoid of any concept of indi-
vidual rights.
The Article concludes by exploring a number of additional comparative ex-
amples outside of Israel. Focusing specifically on Canada, Germany, and France,
it illustrates how a broad comparative perspective is useful in drawing attention
to the roles of courts and legislatures in shaping abortion policies, as well as to
the disguised costs of abortion compromises.
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INTRODUCTION
"Opposition to the Law based on the demographic problem is irrele-
vant.... It is likely that following the Law's enactment, the overall num-
ber of abortions will decrease, as the medical committees will have no
interest in approving numerous abortions unless doing so is justified
according to the criteria provided by the Law. There will always be
fewer abortions approved than sought. Contrary to the current situa-
tion, in which 60, 000 abortions are performed illegally, there may be
only 20-30 thousand legal abortions. The proposed bill does not seek to
decrease the birthrate, but vice versa. "I
In 1973, when the United States Supreme Court announced its decision in
Roe v. Wade,2 Israel started debating the potential for reforming its own abortion
laws, left over from the British Mandatory period. While experiencing the same
cross-national trends toward abortion reform that occurred in the 1970s, 3 the two
countries ended up taking different paths to addressing the abortion issue. As
1. DK (1977) 1229 (lsr.) (statement ofMK Chaika Grossman).
2. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. Within a period of twenty years, between 1967 and 1987, numerous Western European countries
abandoned strict anti-abortion laws through legislative reform. For a comparative analysis of these re-
forms, see MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987). For additional
comparative data and specific country analysis, see THE NEW POLITICS OF ABORTION (Joni Lovendusky
& Joyce Outshoorn eds., 1986).
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opposed to Roe's judicially imposed, strict rights-based approach to abortion,
Israel's 1977 abortion law reform was the product of a legislative compromise
that conceptualized the need for abortion reform in terms that were at odds with
any concept of individual rights. The primary motivation for reform in Israel was
the desire to remedy the demonstrated dysfunction of the country's first abortion
statute. This law, which originated in British Mandatory legislation, criminalized
the performance of all abortions. However, the relevant figures at the time indi-
cated that the law was mostly ignored and that black market abortions flourished.
These figures were a source of particular demographic anxiety for policymakers
and legislators concerned with the small size of the Jewish population in the
newly established country.4 In reforming the old abortion law, legislators sought
to introduce a measure of governmental control into an area in which legal norms
had largely ceased to matter. The assumption was that a more realistic and en-
forceable legal framework would be effective in restricting some abortions and
consequently in protecting the country's vital national interest in population
growth.
It was within this context that Chaika Grossman, one of the very few female
members of the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) in 1977, addressed the "demo-
graphic issue" when introducing a proposed outline for a new abortion bill.
Grossman, chairperson of the Public Services Committee that formulated the
proposed bill and a strong advocate for women's rights, eschewed any rights-talk
in her proposal. As part of her efforts to convince her fellow Members of Knesset
(MKs)--most of them conservative secular and religious men-to endorse the
proposed abortion reform, Grossman formulated her arguments in language that
sought to assuage their national and demographic concerns. In the absence of a
constitutional bill of rights and in light of the general marginality of the Israeli
feminist movement,5 individual rights-based arguments for reproductive free-
doms had little resonance in public discourse. In the parliamentary deliberations
surrounding this bill, most Members of Knesset drew a direct link between the
appropriate scope of the proposed abortion reform and the goal of promoting "the
natural population increase in Israel." 6 Even while supporting a reform that
would legalize abortions based on a broader array of grounds than the country's
first abortion statute, Members of Knesset did so through a discourse centered
on the interests of the Jewish-Zionist collective. They were motivated by the as-
sumption that such a reform would increase the birthrate among middle-class
Jewish women on the one hand, and control the fertility of the less privileged
4. YAEL YISHAI, BETWEEN THE FLAG AND THE BANNER: WOMEN IN ISRAELI POLITICS 212-13
(1997).
5. The feminist movement in Israel started to organize in the early 1970s, a decade after the rise of
second-wave feminism in the United States. The early years were characterized by a lack of organizational
resources and public legitimacy that hindered the movement's ability to push forward its vision of gender
equality. For further elaboration of the emergence of the feminist movement and the sources of its relative
marginality in those years, see infra notes 31-34, 43-50 and accompanying text.
6. DK(1977) 1232 (isr.).
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Jewish sectors of the community on the other hand. Hence, MK Grossman's as-
sertion that the proposed bill "d[id] not seek to decrease the birthrate" was part
of her efforts to articulate the rationale for abortion reform in terms that reflected
the national consensus on the importance of population growth. MK Grossman's
ultimate goal was to guarantee passage of the bill by obtaining a majority vote;
her strategy proved effective.
After a lengthy and acrimonious political debate, the law was approved in
1977 and went into effect in 1978. As opposed to the old law that imposed an
absolute ban on abortions, the new law authorized Abortion Termination Com-
mittees to approve abortions under at least one of five circumstances, including
a woman's social environment and economic circumstances. Proponents of the
abortion reform considered the socioeconomic ground for abortion to be espe-
cially significant in terms of expanding women's legal access to abortion. The
new law also held the promise of greater public funding for abortion. In this re-
spect, Chaika Grossman and other feminist MKs who sponsored the new legis-
lation were successful in facilitating legal access to some abortions that could
not have been secured otherwise. This was achieved, however, through a process
of compromise that resulted in a legal arrangement that conceptualizes abortion
in language devoid of rights-talk.
This Article critically analyzes the give-and-take process in the Israeli legis-
lature that gave birth to the country's abortion law and uncovers the disguised
costs of abortion compromises. From an American perspective, the Israeli case
study provides a cautionary tale of a legal system in which abortion regulation
was decided exclusively by legislators, rather than by judges, which resulted in
legislation devoid of any concept of individual rights. This case study touches
the heart of ongoing debates regarding the wisdom of Roe v. Wade's judicially
imposed, strict rights-based approach to legal abortion, which recognized a
woman's constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy.7 As the issue of abor-
tion remains extremely controversial in American politics and as legislative and
political decisions are making abortions less and less available,8Roe v. Wade and
7. In Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the right to privacy under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extended to a woman's decision to have an abortion, but
that this right must be balanced against the state's two legitimate interests in regulating abortions: protect-
ing women's health and protecting the potentiality of human life. The Court concluded that these state
interests become stronger over the course of a pregnancy and balanced them against the woman's interests
by developing the trimester framework, which permitted greater state regulation of abortion in the second
and third trimesters of pregnancy. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Almost twenty years later, in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, the Court affirmed Roe's basic ruling that a constitutional fight to privacy protects the woman's
decision to have an abortion. However, the Court rejected the trimester framework and replaced it with
the "undue burden" standard for abortion restrictions. This revised standard allows the state to pass any
abortion regulation that promotes its legitimate interests as long as it does not impose a substantive obsta-
cle that prevents a woman from obtaining an abortion. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsyl-
vania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
8. For recent accounts of state legislative initiatives to limit women's access to abortion, see Tamar
Lewin, Ohio Bill Would Ban Abortion if Down Syndrome Is Reason, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2015),
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its progeny have come under heavy critique. It has been argued that the Court's
rights-based rhetoric, coupled with the "undemocratic" judicial imposition of a
resolution to the issue of abortion, played a central role in triggering the ongoing
conflict over abortion. The literature often relies on comparative examples to
argue in favor of legislative and policy solutions to the issue of abortion not cen-
tered on rights-talk. Some scholars contend that if abortions were permitted in
the United States as a result of a democratic legislative process of deliberation,
conciliation, and compromise, rather than a judicial imposition of a strict concept
of rights, it would ease the conflict over abortion and pave the path toward in-
creased access to legal abortion for women.
9
This Article casts doubt on these contentions. Based on analysis of the Israeli
case study, it provides a critical account of abortion legislation that seems to align
with the conciliatory and compromise-based solution advocated by critics of Roe
v. Wade's judicially created right to abortion. The Article argues that the political
compromise that facilitated the enactment of Israel's abortion reform ultimately
resulted in an abortion law that is at odds with the original intention of its fram-
ers, in that it is neither realistic nor enforceable. Lacking a rights framework that
could guide the law's implementation, enforcement agents have been left to out-
line their own framework for regulation. This has resulted in the gradual creation
of alternative mechanisms for abortion approvals that are implemented parallel
to the law rather than within it. In practice, these alternative mechanisms actually
delineate the scope of most abortions performed in Israel today. What appears to
be a legal abortion in Israel is in fact an illegal one.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I questions the superiority of legis-
lative solutions to abortion by tracing the legislative history and normative con-
text that shaped existing abortion law in Israel. It reveals the give-and-take of the
legislative process, which required feminist legislators to put rights-based rheto-
ric aside and to couch proposed abortion legislation in nationalist and religious
frameworks that are at odds with any concept of individual rights. This feminist
compromise was an inevitable product of a majoritarian process in a legislature
immune from judicial review. It ultimately facilitated the repeal of the ground
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/23/us/ohio-bill-would-ban-abortion-if-down-syndrome-is-rea-
son.html; Frances Robles, State Legislatures Put Up Flurry of Roadblocks to Abortion, N.Y. TIMES (May
8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/09/us/politics/state-legislatures-put-up-flurry-of-roadblocks-
to-abortion.html. The constitutionality of one such law, which imposed strict requirements on abortion
clinics in Texas and was expected to leave Texas with approximately seven or eight clinics, serving 5.4
million women of reproductive age, was recently challenged in the Supreme Court. The Court struck down
as undue burdens provisions of the law that required doctors who perform abortions to have difficult-to-
obtain admitting privileges at a local hospital and required abortion clinics to have costly hospital-grade
facilities. See Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). For an account of additional
contemporary initiatives at the federal level to restrict access to abortion, see David M. Herszenhorn,
Abortion Bills Advance, Setting Up a Showdown, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.ny-
times.com/2015/09/1 8/us/abortion-bills-advance-setting-up-a-showdown.html.
9. See infra Section lII.A.
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for abortion that the bill's framers had considered to be most important in ex-
panding women's legal access to abortion: the socioeconomic ground. This de-
velopment undermined the significance of the entire abortion reform and led to
the formation of a law that is unrealistic and unenforceable.
Part II of the Article analyzes the enforcement mechanisms for abortion ap-
proval that developed following the enactment of abortion legislation devoid of
any concept of rights. This Part illustrates how the problematic nature of the re-
formed abortion law prompted the gradual creation of alternative mechanisms
for abortion approvals by the law's primary enforcement agents, the Pregnancy
Termination Committees and the Minister of Health. These mechanisms of cir-
cumvention, which evolved in parallel to formal legislation, are the ones that
actually delineate the scope of "legally performed" abortions in Israel today. The
result is highly problematic in terms of gender equality in Israel and the rule of
law.
Part III returns to Roe v. Wade's democratic and rights-based critique. It ex-
plores the substance of the arguments favoring statutory and conciliatory solu-
tions to abortion and questions their strategic desirability and normative coher-
ence in light of relevant lessons from the Israeli case study. It also broadens the
comparative analysis and discusses developments in abortion legislation in Can-
ada, Germany, and France, highlighting the value of these comparative models
in shedding additional light on the importance of a guiding framework of rights
for developing proper abortion policies.
I. ABORTIONS IN ISRAEL: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. From British Mandatory Law to Israeli Legislation
Until 1977, the abortion law in Israel was based on a set of provisions an-
chored in the British Mandatory Criminal Law Ordinance of 1936.10 These pro-
visions, adopted together with most of the criminal code when the State of Israel
gained independence in 1948, categorically proscribed both performance of
abortions and assistance in the performance of abortions."' This ban on abortions
10. Criminal Code Ordinance No. 74 of 1936, § 175-177, 1936 Palestine Gazette Supp. 1 p. 334-
335.
11. Section 175 of the Criminal Code Ordinance read: "Any person who, with intent to procure
miscarriage of a woman, whether she is or is not with child, unlawfully administers to her or causes her
to take any poison or other noxious thing, or uses any force of any kind, or uses any other means whatever,
is guilty of a felony, and is liable to imprisonment for fourteen years." Id. In 1966 the maximum sentence
for this offence was reduced to five years. See Law for Amendment of the Criminal Code Ordinance (No.
28), 5726 -1966, SH No. 481 (1966) (Isr.). Section 177 of the Criminal Code Ordinance extended criminal
liability to "[ajny person who unlawfully supplies to or procures for any person anything whatever, know-
ing that it is intended to be unlawfully used to procure the miscarriage of a woman, whether she is or is
not with child .... Criminal Code Ordinance No. 74, supra note 10. Alongside these provisions, Section
176 imposed criminal liability and the potential of imprisonment for up to seven years on a pregnant
[Vol. 28:327
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was based on relevant sections in the English Offences Against the Person Act
of 1861.1
In an attempt to allow some room for the performance of abortions within
the framework of the existing legislation, the Supreme Court in 1952 recognized
an exception to the categorical ban on abortion, ruling that the prohibition did
not apply to abortions intended to save the woman's life or to protect her physical
or mental health. 3Still, the reality was that most abortions were performed un-
derground. The number of illegal abortions performed was estimated to be be-
tween 25,000 and 40,000 per year-more than twice the number of legal abor-
tions. ' 4 The prosecutorial policy during that period was to decrease, as much as
possible, the number of criminal charges filed for these offenses and to refrain
from criminal proceedings when procedures were performed in accordance with
the woman's will and did not jeopardize her life or health. 15
In 1972, the Minister of Health appointed a public committee, headed by
Meir Gabai, to study the legal ban on abortions and to recommend amendments
to the abortion statute. Two years later, the Gabai Committee submitted its re-
port, which included a detailed outline for a comprehensive reform. The essence
of this reform was that abortions would continue to be criminally sanctioned ex-
cept in cases in which a three-person committee, consisting of two doctors and a
social worker, approved pregnancy termination based on one of several possible
grounds.' 6 The proposed grounds included, in addition to the woman's life and
health, considerations relating to the woman's socioeconomic condition, the
health of the fetus, the woman's age, and whether the pregnancy stemmed from
rape or incest.
17
woman performing or attempting to perform an abortion on herself, though this provision was abolished
by the Israeli legislature in 1966. Id.
12. The Offences Against the Person Act of 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, §§ 58-59 (Eng.). Under
this Act, any person who, with intent to procure the miscarriage of a woman, unlawfully administered any
noxious thing or used any means whatsoever was subject to imprisonment for up to fourteen years. A
pregnant woman who undertook the same act or consented to its performance was subject to the same
penalty.
13. CrimC (Hi) 207/52 Attorney General v. Horovitz, PM 5712(5) 459 (1952) (Isr.). This decision
followed a similar decision by the English House of Lords: R. v. Bourne [1939] 1 K.B. 687 (Eng.).
14. Report of the Committee for the Study of the Ban on Induced Abortions, 17(4) Public Health
427, 475 (1974) [hereinafter Gabai Committee Report].
15. This policy was drafted by the then Attorney General Haim Cohen. See LOTTE SALZBERGER
ET AL., PATTERNS OF CONTRACEPTIVE BEHAVIOR AMONG JERUSALEM WOMEN SEEKING PREGNANCY
COUNSELING 1980-1989, at 12 (1991); YISHAI, supra note 4, at 209.
16. Gabai Committee Report, supra note 14.
17. Specifically, the Gabai Committee recommended that abortions could be approved by Preg-
nancy Terminations Committees under one of six possible conditions: (I) the continuation of the preg-
nancy constitutes a threat to the life of the woman; (2) the continuation of the pregnancy endangers the
physical or mental health of the woman; (3) there is a potential risk the child would be born with a physical
or mental abnormality; (4) the pregnancy resulted from incest or rape; (5) the woman is either under the
legal age of marriage or over forty-five years old; or (6) grave harm could be caused to the woman or to
her children as a result of the woman's social conditions, including the number of children already part of
her household. Id. at 432.
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Based on the Gabai Committee's recommendations, a number of Members
of Knesset formulated a Bill of Amendment to the Penal Law that slightly ex-
panded the proposed grounds for abortion and added an additional ground: preg-
nancy resulting from extramarital relations.' 8 After official endorsement by the
government, this bill was approved in a preliminary vote and referred to the
Knesset's Public Services Committee for further deliberation.' 9 It was chal-
lenged by a more liberal, alternative bill proposed by MK Marcia Freedman. MK
Freedman was a formal representative of the feminist movement in the Knesset,
and her bill, modeled after the central holding of Roe v. Wade, proposed that the
law allow abortion on demand during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy.2 ° Dur-
ing the Public Services Committee's deliberations, Freedman's alternative bill
was discarded,2' and the Committee focused instead on the bill based on the Ga-
bai Committee's recommendations. A first draft of this bill was brought to an
initial vote in 1976, and the bill was approved into law by the Knesset a year
later, as the Amendment to the Penal Code (Pregnancy Termination) of 1977.22
Following the procedural outline recommended by the Gabai Committee, the
new arrangement maintained a general criminal prohibition on the performance
of abortions, while providing a few additional criteria for exceptions, which,
when applicable, would allow a three-person committee to approve an abortion.
Specifically, the law provided that in order to obtain a legal abortion, a woman
must fulfill one of five criteria: (1) the woman is under marriage age or over
forty; 23 (2) the pregnancy is the result of criminal, non-marital, or incestuous
relations; (3) the fetus is likely to have a physical or mental defect; (4) continu-
ation of the pregnancy is likely to endanger the woman's life or cause her phys-
ical or mental harm; or (5) family or social conditions dictate the abortion.
Two years after the enactment of the original bill, the fifth ground for abor-
tion-known as "the socioeconomic clause"-was repealed by the legislature
and abortion approvals were ultimately restricted to only four permissible
grounds. 24 These grounds were recognized as equally valid throughout the entire
pregnancy, up to full gestation. In practice, however, this would not be the case
for very long.
18. Draft Bill of Amendment to the Penal Law (Abortions), 5736-1975, HH No. 1217 p. 1334 (Isr.).
19. DK(1975) 1328 (Isr.).
20. Draft Bill of Amendment to the Penal Law (Abortions), 5734-1974, in DK (1975) 1334-1335
(Isr.).
21. MARCIA FREEDMAN, EXILE IN THE PROMISED LAND 96 (1991).
22. 5737-1977, SH No. 842 p. 7 0 (lsr.). The law was passed by the Knesset in January 1977. Section
12 of the law stated that it would go into effect one year after its enactment. The law's provisions were
integrated into the Penal Law as sections 312-321 under a new chapter entitled "Pregnancy Termination."
23. The legal age of marriage at the time was seventeen. Several years ago, the Israeli legislature
amended the relevant legislation and the age of marriage was determined to be eighteen. See Marriage
Age Law (Amendment No. 6), 5774-2013, SH No. 2416 p. 58 (Isr.).
24. See infra Section I.C.
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B. Abortion Reform Without Rights
This legislative reform was in accordance with cross-national trends towards
liberalizing restrictive abortion policies25 and was inspired by a number of spe-
cific legal models that were formulated in other countries during the same pe-.
riod.2 6 However, in Israel, several unique circumstances played a role in moti-
vating abortion reform and ultimately contributed to the distinct characteristics
of the final abortion law. Specifically, the call for reformation of the old abortion
law resulted from the confluence of a number of often-conflicting political pres-
sures. Many legislators and government officials were seeking new measures to
respond to national concerns about declining population growth and the differ-
ential fertility rates between Arabs and Jews, which had their own unique rele-
vance in light of the Arab-Israeli conflict.27 Surrounded by heavily populated
Arab states and involved in numerous armed conflicts with a coalition of these
states since its establishment in 1948, Israel's political agenda was shaped by
persistent demographic anxiety and a resultant desire to promote extensive pop-
ulation growth among the Jewish sector of the population.
It was viewed as equally imperative to discourage high birthrates among
poor Jewish families. Research data collected in the 1960s and early 1970s by
two governmental committees showed a correlation between chronic problems
of poverty and ethnicity and family size. 28 This data also drew attention to the
25. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
26. The recommendations of the Gabai Committee were influenced by the British Abortion Act of
1967. While preserving a criminal ban on abortion, the British act authorized abortion in cases where two
registered medical practitioners certified, in good faith, that the continuation of the pregnancy would entail
risk to the life or health of the woman, or to any existing children in her family. It also provided that
"account may be taken of the pregnant woman 's actual or reasonably foreseeable environment." The
primary significance of this reform was the implicit reference to social considerations as a potential ground
for abortion, in addition to the more traditional medical grounds. Abortion Act of 1967, c. 87 (Eng.) (em-
phasis added). In 1990, this Act was amended by the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act of 1990.
Today, it clearly distinguishes between social grounds and medical grounds for abortion and restricts the
former to pregnancies that have not exceeded twenty-four weeks. For an overview of current abortion law
in the United Kingdom, see Abortion Policies: A Global Review, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/abortion/profiles.htm [hereinafter UN, Abortion Policies].
The alternate bill proposed by MK Marcia Freedman declaratively embraced the framework for abortion
regulation dictated by Roe v. Wade. See FREEDMAN, supra note 21, at 90.
27. YISHAI, supra note 4, at 212.
28. In the 1960s, politicians began to realize that unmonitored incentives for population growth
could lead to the intensification of another social problem: high birthrates among poor families. A Natality
Committee, appointed by the Prime Minister to investigate the consequences of the government's indis-
criminate pro-natality policy, highlighted the problem of large families among the poor, who were mostly
of North African and Middle Eastern origin, and recommended, for the first time, the development of
programs for family planning among these sectors of the population. At an average of 4.4 children per
woman, the fertility rate for Jewish women of North African and Middle Eastern origin was almost double
that of Jewish women of European origin, who had on average 2.5 children. The urgent need for family
planning services was further stressed by another committee, appointed in 1972 to investigate problems
of children and youth in distress. This second committee collected significant data on these issues and
focused public attention on the growing social gap between large (and most often poor) families and fam-
ilies with fewer children. See SALZBERGER ET AL., supra note 15, at 7; YISHAI, supra note 4, at 213; Delila
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manner in which social deprivation among certain sectors of the Jewish
population could have grave effects on future generations and, consequently, on
the development of the state. 29 The idea of adopting a more nuanced policy that
encouraged family planning among the poor (who were mostly of North African
and Middle Eastern origin) while simultaneously promoting pro-birth policies
among the more affluent (who were mostly of European origin) was gradually
gaining support. An increased governmental commitment to pregnancy termina-
tion law enforcement was perceived to be an important measure in promoting
both of these national goals. The assumption was that more realistic and enforce-
able legal norms would enable law enforcement authorities to better control the
availability of abortions based on both pro-fertility and family-planning state in-
terests.
30
In addition, a political call for abortion reform came from advocates of
women's rights in the Knesset and from the emerging Israeli feminist movement,
organized in the early 1970s primarily by American immigrants who were in-
spired by the rise of second-wave feminism a decade earlier in the United States
and by the American feminist efforts to liberalize abortion that eventually led to
Roe v. Wade.31 These forces called for a legislative reform that would recognize
a woman's right to abortion. 32 In 1973, the feminist movement joined forces with
the Party for Civil Rights and Peace and was guaranteed the third place on the
party slate for one of its representatives. The war that broke out between Israel
and a coalition of Arab states, led by Egypt, in October of that year resulted in
thousands of casualties on the Israeli side and gave the Party for Civil Rights and
Amir & Niva Shoshi, Feminism and Empowerment of Women in Israel: Abortion Policy as a Test Case,
in EMPOWERMENT ON TRIAL 777, 792-97 (Mimi Ajzenstadt & Guy Mundlak eds., 2007).
29. YISHAI, supra note 4, at 213-14.
30. Despite the unique characteristics of Israeli society at the time, it is important to note that the
idea of an abortion policy that draws class and race distinctions between those who are "unfit" to reproduce
and those who should be encouraged to reproduce for the sake of the nation can be found in the American
context as well. The campaign for criminalizing all abortions that was launched by the American Medical
Association in the mid-nineteenth century relied heavily on racial and class-based politics. It ended suc-
cessfully in 1890 when most states passed laws criminalizing all abortion with the exception of cases of
medical necessity. While these laws would ultimately affect all women, the anti-abortion campaign fo-
cused on middle class, white, Anglo-Saxon, married women. The argument was that these women were
the ones obtaining abortions and consequently threatening to undermine the dominance and power of the
Anglo-Saxon elite. See Nicola Beisel & Tamara Kay, Abortion, Race, and Gender in Nineteenth-Century
America, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 498 (2004). Similarly, sterilization policies designed to prevent the "unfit"
from reproducing were developed around the same time and were based on similar rationales purporting
to improve the population. See generally NICOLE HAHN RAFTER, CREATING BORN CRIMINALS (1998).
Even now, sterilization policies are largely directed against poor and minority women, who are much more
likely to be sterilized or have a hysterectomy or tubal ligation in the United States than are middle-class
white women. See Charlotte Rutherford, Reproductive Freedoms and African American Women, 4 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 255 (1992).
31. A personal perspective on the rise and formation of the Israeli feminist movement in the early
1970s and its contribution to the campaign for abortion reform can be found in the memoirs of Marcia
Freedman. See FREEDMAN, supra note 21.
32. YISHAI, supra note 4, at 214.
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Peace an unexpected victory-three seats in the Knesset.33 The new feminist
movement elected MK Marcia Freedman to be its official representative in the
legislature. Thus, the call for abortion reform was diverse and represented a num-
ber of conflicting political agendas. A few proponents conceptualized the pro-
posed reform as a clear issue of individual rights,34 while the vast majority en-
dorsed this move based on national demographic concerns that were completely
detached from rights discourse. Both angles were instrumental in mobilizing the
process of legislative reform. While each of the distinctive rationales for abortion
reform was initially put on the legislative agenda, the rights agenda was eventu-
ally set aside. All supporters of the proposed reform united behind the demo-
graphic agenda, as evidenced by a comparison between the prevailing legislative
rhetoric supporting the proposed reform in its initial stages and the manner in
which it was discussed in later stages.
The original proposed amendment to the penal law on abortion was submit-
ted as a private bill endorsed by the government and sponsored by several Mem-
bers of Knesset, MK Chaika Grossman and four other female MKs among them.
This bill was based on the recommendations of the Gabai Committee regarding
the establishment of Pregnancy Termination Committees and a list of criteria
under which these committees might approve abortions in individual cases. In
the preliminary stages of deliberation, one of the sponsors of this Bill, MK Haviv
Shimoni of the ruling Labor Party, spoke explicitly about the considerations of
gender equality that stood behind the proposed reform. When presenting the in-
itial draft of the proposed legislation to the Knesset for a preliminary vote in
1975, before it was referred to the Public Services Committee, MK Shimoni de-
scribed the efforts of female Labor Party members to include a special clause in
the Labor Party's platform.35 This clause declared that the Party would:
33. The 1973 October War was a breaking point for the Israeli public. When the war ended, public
criticism intensified. Many people thought that the government, headed by the Labor Party, had failed.
Although the Labor Party remained the ruling party after the parliamentary elections held in December, it
lost five seats in the Knesset. The Party for Civil Rights and Peace, which was established that year by
Shulamit Aloni, a former member of the Labor Party, and advocated electoral reform, peace, and human
rights, got some of the votes that the Labor Party lost. See generally Naomi Chazan, Shulamit Aloni,
JEWISH WOMEN'S ARCHIVE, https://jwa.org/encyclopedia/article/aloni-shulamit; 1973 Elections, NAT'L
LIBR. ISR.,
http://web.nli.org.ii/sites/NLL/English/collections/treasures/elections/all-elections/Pages/el 973.aspx.
34. For instance, in her legislative proposal for abortion reform that was initially endorsed by six
other Members of Knesset, Marcia Freedman added an explanatory note that read: "Another relevant uni-
versal development is the growing recognition that a preferable status should be granted to human rights
and among them individual liberty and freedom of belief and conscience. The right to choose feely [] to
bring a child to the world involves a decision regarding the willingness to bear the burdens of pregnancy,
the desire to marry and to have a family, to extend it, to raise children and to drastically change ways of
life and future plans. This right is therefore a predominant aspect of individual liberty that cannot be
unjustly restricted." Draft Bill of Amendment to the Penal Law (Abortions), in DK (1975) 1334-1335,
5734-1974 (Isr.).
35. DK(1975) 1317 (Isr.).
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endeavor to accelerate the work of the expert committee appointed by
the Minister of Health for the purpose of studying the subject of abor-
tions. The comnittee's findings and recommendations will be discussed
in an effort to honor a woman's right to choose, within the necessary
limitations for ensuring her health, as recommended by certified medical
consultation services.
36
He concluded by exploring the significance of the fact that 1975 had been de-
clared International Women's Year:
I do not think that I exaggerate when I say that women in Israel, as a
result of their very activity, with natural regard for their place in society,
have garnered unprecedented achievements.... The fact that the indi-
vidual presenting the bill is not a woman attests to the level of identifi-
cation with and recognition of women's rights and their place in soci-
ety.3
7
This detailed reference to gender equality by one of the sponsors of the bill,
which drew an explicit link between the proposed abortion reform and the status
of women in society, did not repeat itself in subsequent parliamentary delibera-
tions. It was the first and the last time during the lengthy legislative debate that
legislators would focus on gender equality as a central rationale for the bill.
Moreover, the alternative bill sponsored by MK Marcia Freedman, which was
based on a clear conception of women's rights and modeled after the central
holding of Roe v. Wade, was soon set aside by the Public Services Committee. 38
The Committee, chaired by MK Chaika Grossman, decided to focus exclusively
on the more restrictive version of the bill originally proposed by the Gabai Com-
mittee, which excluded any mention of rights.
In her memoir, written years later, Marcia Freedman argued that Chaika
Grossman was responsible for the failure of Freedman's proposed bill in the Pub-
lic Services Committee. 39 She argued that, out of self-centered political consid-
erations, Grossman convinced most members of the committee, who initially
supported Freedman's proposal, to endorse the more restrictive alternative. Ac-
cording to this narrative, Grossman and the other female Members of Knesset
from the Labor Party complied with pressure from the Party's leadership to sup-
port the bill that was seen as representing the Party's official position on abortion.
Essentially, Freedman argued that Grossman and the other female Labor MKs
sacrificed the interests of women on the altar of self-centered considerations.4 °
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1319.
38. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
39. FREEDMAN, supra note 21, at 96.
40. Id. at 90-91.
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However, the parliamentary record tells a more nuanced story than Freedman's
recollection of the events.
It is clear that the majority of legislators who were inclined to support the
proposed reform did not necessarily draw a link between abortion legislation and
women's rights. Their impetus for reform stemmed from demographic concerns,
and they were primarily aiming to secure government control in an area where
legal norms had ceased to matter. There was a nearly complete absence of any
conception of rights as an organizing framework for the legal regulation of preg-
nancy terminations. Contrary to legal models formulated in other countries dur-
ing that time, which acknowledged the pregnant woman (and sometimes the fe-
tus) as possessing individual constitutional rights,41 in Israel, the woman (as well
as the fetus) was treated as an object. The debate, even among most proponents
of the bill, revolved around the manner in which wider access to abortion would
serve national interests, particularly the ability to control fertility rates among
underprivileged strata, while not adversely affecting the demographic interests
of the State of Israel in promoting population growth.
For instance, Minister of Health Victor Shem-Tov, who appointed the Gabai
Committee, explained during the first parliamentary deliberation regarding the
proposed reform:
There is a public misconception whereby family planning would neces-
sarily lead to a decrease in birthrate .... Family planning would cause
regulation of the birthrate without decreasing the natural propagation in
which we are necessarily interested, but rather the opposite: it may lead
families currently having one or two children to increase the number of
children, while families having a multitude of children... without hav-
ing the ability to support and educate them, might perhaps reach a more
desirable plan for the family.
4 2
These prevailing attitudes toward abortion reform should be understood in
light of two significant characteristics of Israeli law and society in the early
1970s. First, an important aspect of Israeli society that played a role in shaping
social and legal attitudes toward pregnancy termination was the nationalist and
patriarchal expectation that women would contribute to the nation's growth by
fulfilling their maternal role.43 This expectation was inspired by the national
41. Two notable examples from the 1970s are the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), and the 1975 Western German Constitutional Court decision, 39 BVERFGE 1 (1975)
(Ger.). For an analysis of the significance of the rights framework that underlies the German decision and
its relation to the American decision, see infra notes 195-196 and accompanying text.
42. DK (1975) 1322 (Isr.).
43. NOYA RIMALT, LEGAL FEMINISM FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: THE STRUGGLE FOR GENDER
EQUALITY IN ISRAEL AND THE U.S. 129-38 (2010); Nitza Berkovitch, Motherhood as a National Mission:
The Construction of Womanhood in the Legal Discourse in Israel, 20 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 605, 607
(1997); Noya Rimalt, Equality with a Vengeance: Female Conscientious Objectors in Pursuit of a Voice
and Substantive Gender Equality, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 99, 104-08 (2007); Noya Rimalt, Good
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ethos that accompanied the founding of the State in 1948, according to which
Israel, established as a response to the Holocaust, was predestined to bring about
the rejuvenation of the Jewish people in their homeland. Increasing the size of
the Jewish population by encouraging women to have more children was also
deemed vital to the country's political future in light of the Arab-Israeli con-
flict. 44 Numerous laws that were enacted in the country's formative years were
designed to achieve this goal by encouraging the influx of Jews to the newly
established country and by promoting a higher birthrate among Jewish women.4 5
Encouraging large families among the Jewish population and reinforcing a pro-
natality climate through policies and incentives in a broad range of public spheres
were especially important as birth rates among Jewish women declined in the
decades following the establishment of the State46 and the impact of immigration
on population growth appeared to be unsatisfactory.4 7
A second characteristic of the Israeli legal system that sheds light on the
manner in which most Israeli legislators approached the issue of abortion was
the lack of a constitution or a bill of rights. Israel did not adopt a written consti-
tution or a bill of rights upon its establishment. It was only in 1992 that the Knes-
set finally enacted two Basic Laws, which enshrined several human rights and
are now perceived as Israel's semi-Bill of Rights. 48 Legislation that was drafted
Mother, Bad Mother, Irrelevant Mother: Parenthood in Law Between the Ideal of Equality and the Reality
of Motherhood, 39 MISHPATIM 573, 581-84 (2010).
44. David Ben-Gurion, the country's first Prime Minister and one of its founding fathers, articulated
the notion of women's reproductive responsibility in his memoirs: "Every Jewish mother can and must
understand that the unique situation of the Jewish People ... imposes on her a sacred duty to do her utmost
for the nation's rapid growth. One of the conditions for growth is that every family has at least four sons
and daughters, and the more the better." See DAVID BEN-GURION, ISRAEL: A PERSONAL HISTORY 839
(1971). One of the government's methods of supporting pro-birth policies in the 1950s was a system of
cash prizes for women bearing their tenth child. The program was discontinued in 1959 when it was real-
ized that the majority of women awarded the prize were Arabs. LESLEY HAZELTON, ISRAELI WOMEN: THE
REALITY BEHIND THE MYTHS 71 (1977); SALZBERGER ET AL., supra note 15, at 6. In 1967 the Demo-
graphic Center was established as part of the Prime Minister's office. Its official goal was "to act system-
atically in carrying out natality policy intended to foster a psychologically favorable climate, such that
natality will be encouraged and stimulated, an increase in natality being crucial for the whole Jewish
people." Id. at 7.
45. One of the first laws that provided a legal basis for pro-immigration policy was the Law of
Return, passed by the Knesset in the early 1950s. This law encouraged Jews from around the world to
settle in Israel with the assistance of the State. See Law of Return, 5710-1954, SH No. 51 p. 159 (Isr.).
Another significant law was the Labor of Women Law. Enacted in 1954, this law provided numerous
maternity rights to working women, such as paid maternity leave or reduced working hours for mothers
of young children, in an effort to ease the double burden of motherhood and paid labor. See Labor of
Women Law, 5714-1954, SH No. 16 0 p. 154 (Isr.). For a discussion of the social attitudes toward women's
maternal role that shaped this bill, see RIMALT, supra note 43, at 135-38; Rimalt, Good Mother, supra
note 43.
46. In 1951, the average number of children among Jewish women was four. This number de-
creased to 3.3 in 1962 and to 3.2 in 1972. See ZIONA PELED & NANCY BACKMAN, INDUCED ABORTIONS
IN ISRAEL: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH ON APPLICATIONS TO THE PREGNANCY TERMINATION COMMITTEES
5 (1978); YISHAI, supra note 4, at 212.
47. YISHAI, supra note 4, at 212.
48. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, SH No. 1391 (Isr.); Basic Law: Freedom
of Occupation, 5754-1994, SH No. 1454 (Isr.). In a landmark 1995 Israeli Supreme Court decision, the
Court determined that these Basic Laws constitute Israel's semi-constitutional bill of rights and form the
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in the 1970s was therefore formally immune from judicial review. In the absence
of a guiding framework of constitutional rights, legislators were not accustomed
to taking into account the normative restraints of individual rights when formu-
lating new legislation.
These two characteristics of Israeli law and society contributed to the rela-
tive marginality of the feminist movement in those years and rendered arguments
in favor of gender equality negligible and ineffective in shaping public dis-
course. 49 In the early 1970s, women were almost completely absent from the
.decision-making levels in the economic, political, and social spheres.5" Moreo-
ver, due to the prominent role played by American immigrants in the establish-
ment of the Israeli feminist movement, feminism was identified as a foreign im-
port and perceived as alien to Israel's collective values. It was even seen as a
threat in that it undermined women's readiness to accept the dominant national
agenda. Two wars in that period between Israel and a coalition of Arab states-
the Six-Day War of 1967 and the 1973 October War-further entrenched the
national security agenda and rendered ideas of individual freedoms and gender
equality secondary to public concerns related to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
It appears that within this context, MK Chaika Grossman estimated that
rights-talk would hinder the potential for abortion reform. She assumed that leg-
islation based on the Gabai Committee's recommendations would better resonate
with the concerns of the majority of legislators, so she articulated her arguments
in support of the bill accordingly. Moreover, the parliamentary record suggests
that she and other sponsors of the bill believed that adding a socioeconomic
ground for abortion as part of the proposed reform would practically address the
needs and interests of most women seeking abortions. The relevant data at the
time indicated that the majority of abortions were performed because of familial,
economic, or social reasons and were not medically or criminally related.5 Thus,
the socioeconomic clause was considered by the bill's sponsors to be a signifi-
cant expansion of women's legal access to abortion and therefore a reasonable
substitute for MK Freedman's rights-talk and her proposal for abortion on de-
mand in the first trimester, which did not enjoy wide support in the Knesset.
Under these circumstances, the primary challenge for Grossman and other spon-
sors of the bill was to rhetorically frame the rationale for abortion reform, and
basis for the exercise ofjudicial review. See Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Vill., 49(4) PD 221
(1995) (lsr.).
49. Noga Morag-Levine, Abortion in Israel: Community, Rights, and the Context of Compromise,
19 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 313, 321 (1994).
50. RIMALT, supra note 43, at 141; Yael Azmon, Women and Politics: The Case of Israel,
10 WOMEN & POL. 43,46 (1990).
51. The Gabai Committee Report that served as a basis for the proposed abortion reform referred
specifically to this point, citing data from a 1969 study that revealed that, among underprivileged groups,
82.1% of requests for pregnancy termination were based on socioeconomic reasons. Gabai Committee
Report, supra note 14, at 469. These data were corroborated by another study of socially deprived families,
in which respondents identified the problem of unintended pregnancy as a major predicament, third only
to financial and housing difficulties. See SALZBERGER ET AL., supra note 15, at 7.
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particularly for the socioeconomic ground for abortion, in a way that addressed
the concerns of most legislators.
After the Public Services Committee, chaired by Grossman, agreed on a final
draft of the bill, it was brought to the Knesset for further deliberation and ap-
proval. Grossman, who introduced this draft to all the Members of Knesset,
sought to rally broader support for the draft before the first, second, and third
votes.52 As the quote at the beginning of this Article indicates, she refrained from
referring to women's rights and clung to rhetoric that addressed the sentiments
of most legislators, stressing once again:
Opposition to the Law based on the demographic problem is irrele-
vant.... It is likely that following the Law's enactment, the overall
number of abortions would decrease, as the medical committees would
have no interest in approving numerous abortions unless doing so is jus-
tified according to the criteria provided by the Law.... The proposed
bill does not seek to decrease the birthrate, but vice versa.5 3
Indeed, legislative records from this period reveal that nationally oriented ap-
peals provided the most significant unifying framework for garnering support for
the bill. These records illustrate that support for the bill relied, in most cases, on
an unwavering normative position regarding the legitimacy of the regimentation
of women's bodies on behalf of national interests. Support for the bill almost
completely disregarded the position that viewed the woman (or the fetus) as be-
ing in possession of legitimate rights.
The near-complete absence of rights-talk among the proponents of the bill
and their adherence to the national-demographic discourse as a legitimate basis
for regulation of abortion created an unexpected bond between the bill's support-
ers and the bill's opponents, most of them representatives of the religious and
ultra-Orthodox parties in the Knesset. As opposed to the Catholic faith, Jewish
attitudes towards abortion are more nuanced and revolve around a distinction
between necessary and unnecessary abortion that rests on the supremacy of ma-
ternal life in Jewish law.5 4 In the eyes of ancient Jewish law, the fetus has no
52. Knesset bills "are advanced in a number of stages, called readings. Every reading of a bill is
adopted or rejected by a vote of the Knesset members present in the Plenum at the time. Between each
reading, there are debates within the Knesset committees, and they prepare the bill for the next stage of
legislation. After passing the third reading, the bill is published in the Official Gazette and becomes a law
of the State of Israel." Legislation, KNESSET, https://www.knesset.gov.il/descrip-
tion/eng/eng-work mel2.htm.
53. DK(1977) 1229 (Isr.).
54. See YAEL HASHILONI DOLEV, A LIFE (UN)WORTHY OF LIVING: REPRODUCTIVE GENETICS IN
ISRAEL AND GERMANY 94, 99 (2007); DAVID M. FELDMAN, BIRTH CONTROL IN JEWISH LAW: MARITAL
RELATIONS, CONTRACEPTION, AND ABORTION As SET FORTH IN THE CLASSIC TEXTS OF JEWISH LAW 275
(1995).
[Vol. 28:327
When Rights Don't Talk
legal status since it is deemed part of its mother rather than an independent en-
tity.55 Hence, religious opposition to the law in the Knesset did not mirror a typ-
ical Western pro-life stance. While Orthodox Jewish MKs expressed their com-
plete objection to the bill as a whole,56 it turned out that, in actuality, most of
their criticism was focused on the socioeconomic clause that allowed for abortion
approvals to be based on a woman's social environment and economic circum-
stances. Their criticism relied on pro-natality arguments that were not substan-
tially different from those made by the bill's proponents, at least with regard to
the nature of the interests that should dictate the legal framework for abortions.
MK Menachem Porush of the Religious Torah Front explained:
It is hard to accept the mere thought of proposing such law, a law that
contravenes the foundations of Torah,... a law that contravenes the
foundations and basic interests of our existence in this land as we face
off in bitter competition with the Arabs within our borders and their nat-
ural propagation. We, who yeam for each new Jewish immigrant, shall
enact a law that slays children in their mothers' womb only because
there are already multiple children? How much toil, blood and sweat
must we invest to achieve the immigration of 10,000 new Jewish inmi-
grants? 57
In addition, central to the religious position were Halakhic beliefs and inter-
ests concerning the purity and wholesomeness of the family. Using such beliefs,
it was easy to rally the support of Jewish Orthodox MKs to permit abortions in
cases where the pregnancy did not stem from circumstances of a traditional fam-
ily-such as single women's pregnancies, or pregnancies of married women in
situations of adultery. This ground for abortion, which applied to all situations in
which the pregnancy was "out of wedlock," was not included in the original out-
line of the bill recommended by the Gabai Committee; rather, it was added to the
bill by its sponsors in the Knesset.5 8 As attested by parliamentary debate, the "out
of wedlock" abortion provision enjoyed wide consensus from the outset. It was
intended to allow abortion with no restrictions whatsoever for single women and
married women who conceived out of wedlock, and were therefore expected to
bear a child who, from a Jewish religious perspective, would be considered a
"bastard., 59 As "bastards" and their descendants are to be excluded from the
55. DOLEV, supra note 54.
56. For instance, MK Porush of the Religious Torah Front declared: "It is obvious that we abso-
lutely object to this law as whole .... DK (1975) 1324 (Isr.), and MK Shlomo Yaakov Gross of the same
party characterized abortion as "the murder of a fetus in his mother's womb with no reason," DK (1977)
1237 (Isr.).
57. DK(1975) 1324-1325 (Isr.).
58. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
59. Under Jewish law, a child bom to a married woman as a result of an extramarital affair is
considered a bastard (mamzer). This status excludes this child and his or her descendants from the Jewish
community for ten generations by forbidding them from marrying an ordinary (non-mamzer) Jewish
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Jewish community under traditional Orthodox Jewish law, the birth of such chil-
dren is perceived as a threat to the continuity of the Jewish collective. Hence, it
was in the name of religious precepts-which held that single mothers or chil-
dren born out of wedlock ought to be excluded from the definition of "proper"
families and "proper" children-that the formal array of grounds for abortion
was expanded from the originally proposed outline. This outcome was at odds
with the combative religious rhetoric against the bill writ large.60 At the same
time, these religious precepts provided proponents of the bill with an opportunity
to legalize abortion based on a broader array of grounds. Eventually, most of the
opposition of the religious and ultra-Orthodox MKs was directed, as stated pre-
viously, toward the socioeconomic ground.
Their arguments against the bill in general and against the socioeconomic
clause in particular were not in any way rights-based, but rather were motivated
by concerns about the future of the Jewish people, the value of large families,
and the perceived role of women as the guardians of the family. 61 In that respect,
preserving the traditional function of women as child-bearers through the en-
forcement of the biblical command to "be fruitful and multiply '62 was the pri-
mary concern of the Jewish Orthodox MKs. They were not concerned with the
protection of the right to life of the fetus. While the legislative proposal to pro-
vide access to abortion to adulterous married women was never contested and
was even implicitly endorsed by the ultra-Orthodox parties, 63 granting access to
spouse during that period of time. Philippa Strum, Women and the Politics of Religion in Israel, 11 HUM.
RTS. Q. 483, 494 (1989).
60. For two illustrative comments from MKs, see supra note 56.
61. MK Pinhas Shifman of the National Religious Front argued:
Don't we know that in every newborn there is an addition to [national] security? Don't we
understand that giving such considerably easy opportunity to abortion will cause greater [sex-
ual] permissiveness that has anyhow reached an enormous degree? As long as there is re-
striction on the performance of abortion, there is a stop in permissiveness and in conducting
free life that involve[s] a disgrace and [carries] harsh. consequences [for] a stable family life.
DK (1976) 1398 (Isr.). MK Yaakov Gross of the Religious Torah Front added:
What can we say to the world? On the one side we invest billions ... to absorb Jews and to
bring them to the Land of Israel, but on the other side we invest money to murder Jews. What
is the logic in that? I no longer talk about the demographic problem. I cited here once the words
of one Arab from the village of Sachnin that said: [while] you bear one child my wife bears
five children. This is also true; this is also an argument-the demographic problem-and we
have to take it into consideration. Therefore I say: whoever has a Jewish glimmer in his heart,
should not raise his hand to support this law in its current form.
DK (1977) 1239 (lsr.).
62. Genesis 1:28.
63. The parliamentary record reveals that, in general, the "out of wedlock" ground for abortion
attracted very little attention and was hardly contested. The "adultery" aspect of this ground was not once
mentioned specifically throughout the lengthy deliberations, and it appears that everyone, including the
religious Members of Knesset, fully endorsed this proposed ground. The only MK who declared his ob-
jection to the "out of wedlock" ground for abortion in its entirety and proposed to eliminate it from the
legislative proposal was the secular conservative MK Menachem Yadid from the right-wing Likud party.
Yadid based his objection on "national concerns" regarding the size of the Jewish population. However,
it appears that, in actuality, his criticism was focused on single women and not on adulterous women. DK
(1977) 1232-1233 (lsr.). His reservation was ultimately rejected by a large majority vote. Id. at 1258.
Members of the national religious and ultra-Orthodox parties focused their efforts on outlining access to
abortion that would be compatible with religious norms. The very few religious MKs who expressed some
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abortion to married women based on socioeconomic considerations was per-
ceived as a symbolic and substantive threat to the Jewish family and to traditional
religious norms. After all, the average fertility rate for ultra-Orthodox Jewish
women is almost triple the average birthrate in Israel. 64 Family planning and the
use of contraceptives are incompatible with the community's prevailing ideology
regarding the role of women in society.65 This often leads to severe economic
hardship among members of the ultra-Orthodox community. Indeed, this com-
munity is one of the poorest in Israel. 66 Yet the hegemonic religious discourse
presents large families as a mandatory religious norm to be followed, regardless
of economic hardship.67 Restricting married women's access to abortion in situ-
ations of social and financial hardship therefore serves a crucial interest of the
ultra-Orthodox leadership in maintaining high birthrates among women of their
community and in maintaining control over women's bodies. More broadly, it
delivers a symbolic message regarding the proper role of women in society and
the sanctity of large families.
In sum, the dispute between the bill's proponents and opponents with regard
to the socioeconomic ground took place in the same ideological realm in which
the appropriate legal scope of abortion regulation was defined based on an array
of considerations relating to the Jewish collective. This shared understanding of
the proper ideological realm for parliamentary deliberation had two key results
in terms of delineating the boundaries of the law eventually approved by the
Knesset. First, it fostered the creation of curious alliances between opponents
objection to the "out of wedlock" ground for abortion focused explicitly on single women and suggested
adding an age limit. MK Pinhas Sheinman from the Religious National Front and MK Yaakov Gross from
the ultra-Orthodox Religious Torah Front suggested that, instead of providing unrestricted abortion access
to all unmarried women, legal abortion should be restricted to unmarried women under the age of sixteen.
MK Gross explained that this situation "is prohibited by the Halacha and according to the [Jewish] law [a
woman under sixteen] should perform abortion." DK (1977) 1239 (]sr.). This proposal did not spark any
discussion or debate and was eventually rejected along with the proposal by MK Yadid. Id. at 1258.
64. The average fertility rate among the general Jewish population in Israel is 2.6 children per
woman, as opposed to 7.7 children per women in strictly ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities. This figure
is related to the very low average marriage age among the ultra-Orthodox of 19.9, compared to 24.8 among
the general Jewish population. See Norma Gurovich & Eilat Cohen-Kastro, Ultra-Orthodox Jews Geo-
graphic Distribution and Demographic, Social and Economic Characteristics of the Ultra-Orthodox Jew-
ish Population in Israel 1996-2001, at 30 (Cent. Stat. Bureau, Working Paper Series No. 5, 2004) (lsr.).
65. Id. at 27; see also SUSAN MARTHA KAHN, REPRODUCING JEWS: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT OF
ASSISTED CONCEPTION IN ISRAEL 3 (2000); JACQUELINE PORTUGESE, FERTILITY POLICY IN ISRAEL: THE
POLITICS OF RELIGION, GENDER AND NATION 45-47 (1998).
66. The average income per capita among ultra-Orthodox families is one-fourth that of the general
Jewish population. Gurovich & Cohen-Kastro, supra note 64, at 51.
67. MK Yaakov Gross from the Religious Torah Front argued passionately when calling on Mem-
bers of the Knesset to object to the socioeconomic clause, or at least to the clause's reference to the
woman's number of children: "Gentlemen, we know from reality that there are families in Jerusalem,
Bnei-Brak and all over the country that have eight children in one room, two rooms and neither think that
because of this a pregnancy should be terminated .... This is a sign that it is possible to live in two rooms
with eight children and it is possible also to educate them." DK (1977) 1239 (Isr.). Delila Amir and Niva
Shoshi note that the ultra-Orthodox perceived the socioeconomic clause as a direct attack on their tradi-
tional ways of life and therefore focused most of their efforts on abolishing it. See Dalila Amir & Niva
Shoshi, Israeli Abortion Law: Feminist and Gender Implications, in STUDIES OF LAW, GENDER AND
FEMINISM (Daphne Barak Erez et al. eds., 2007).
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and proponents of the law. For example, MK Menachem Yadid of the right-wing
Likud Party, who opposed the bill during the first vote, declared that he would
vote against it "out of responsibility for the fate of the nation and faith in the
future of the Land of Israel. 68 He explained his opposition: "for a healthy soci-
ety, we would do best to care for underprivileged and destitute families by im-
proving their housing conditions, and above all dedicating our attention to edu-
cation and guidance." 69 During the second vote, MK Yadid retracted his
comprehensive opposition to the bill, clarifying that, since there was no chance
at that stage to have the bill stricken from the agenda, he sought only to rally
support for his particular reservations. MK Yadid found an unexpected ally in
his opposition to the socioeconomic clause in MK Ari Ankorion of the Labor
Party, the ruling party sponsoring the abortion reform. MK Ankorion did not
oppose the bill in its entirety, but supported the proposition to delete the phrase
"including a large number of children residing with her" from the socioeconomic
clause. In its original version, this provision provided that a woman could receive
approval from the Pregnancy Termination Committees if "continuation of the
pregnancy might cause severe harm to the woman or her children, due to the
harsh familial or social conditions of such woman or her environs, including a
large number of children residing with her."70 "If you ask me why," MK
Ankorion explained,
I would say that even in our generation, we who are living here, present
in this Knesset, have made huge sacrifices during the years of the Hol-
ocaust that befell our People, including vast numbers of children. This
is a country of immigration, where we have such need for a multiplicity
of children, such a great need for a multiplicity of Jews in this land.71
This position enjoyed vast support among both the bill's opponents-whether
secular, religious or ultra-Orthodox-and amongst its proponents, most of whom
did not challenge the principle that the demographic interest of the State of Israel
in encouraging a higher birthrate among Jewish women should influence the
scope of abortion legislation. The result was that the only amendment to the bill
approved during the second and third votes was the amendment jointly initiated
by MKs Yadid and Ankorion. The socioeconomic provision was thus approved
in its abridged version, which omitted from the law any reference to a woman's
number of children as a possible ground on which the Pregnancy Termination
Committee might approve abortion.
A second important feature of the final abortion law, which also derived
from the ideological consensus during the debate, was the absolute absence of
68. DK(1976) 1596 (Isr.).
69. Id. at 1595.
70. Draft Bill of Amendment to the Penal Law (Abortions), 5736-1975, HH No. 1217 p. 1334 (Isr.).
71. DK(1977) 1253 (lsr.).
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any reference to gestation period as a factor in determining the permissibility of
abortion. According to the language that was eventually approved by the Knes-
set, the grounds for abortion listed in Section 316 of the Penal Law were recog-
nized as equally valid throughout the entire pregnancy, up to full gestation. This
aspect of the law created a significant difference between the abortion law for-
mulated in Israel and arrangements in other Western countries, where the liber-
alization of abortion laws was based on a perception of rights. In these other
countries, clear boundaries for pregnancy termination were delineated according
to the potential viability of the fetus.72 In Israel, on the other hand, where factors
like the fetus's status and rights-talk in general were excluded from the process
of formulating the law, abortions were permitted based on the exact same
grounds, whether sought in the first week of pregnancy or the last. This fact was
only marginally noted in Knesset deliberations, and even then, the issue did not
spark any significant debate or opposition. 73 This fact is particularly intriguing
since, at an earlier stage, the Knesset had considered a bill sponsored by MK
Marcia Freedman, which presented an alternative abortion reform based on the
American constitutional outline formulated at the time.74 Adhering to Roe v.
Wade's central holding, Freedman proposed that the law grant women an unre-
stricted right to abortion during the first trimester and restrict this right at later
72. An important example is Sweden, which was one of the first Western countries to acknowledge
social circumstances as legal grounds for pregnancy termination in the 1930s. The transition to a rights
framework that acknowledges a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy occurred in 1960s and 1970s,
with the appointment of a public commission tasked with examining existing legislation and recommend-
ing amendments thereto. The commission's recommendations, which served as the basis for a new abor-
tion law enacted by the Swedish parliament in 1974, determined that a woman's will should be a central
consideration in pregnancy termination. The law granted all women a right to terminate pregnancy on
demand until the eighteenth week of pregnancy. The authority to approve later-term abortions was vested
in a national committee for health and welfare. The law provided that such approval should not routinely
be granted in cases in which the fetus was viable; only special reasons would justify terminating the preg-
nancy at that stage. The law further provided that when continuation of the pregnancy jeopardized the life
or health of the woman, abortion could be approved at any stage of the pregnancy. See UN, Abortion
Policies, supra note 26. For a discussion of the significance of legal developments in Sweden with regard
to abortion and their relationship to the emergence ,of similar rights-based discourse on abortion in other
Western countries, see Noya Rimalt, From Unjust and Partial Access to Just Legislation: Toward a New
Paradigm ofAbortion Law in Israel, 39 TEL AvIv U.L. REV. 415 (2016).
73. Only two Members of Knesset, Benjamin Halevy and Zerah Verheftig, raised this issue when
the Knesset debated the proposed reform before its first reading. They suggested that when the Social
Services Committee prepared the bill for the second and third readings, it should add a reference to the
first twelve weeks of pregnancy as the period in which abortion could be approved by the Committees.
Both MKs contended that when Chaika Grossman first introduced the proposed reform, she claimed that
the suggested grounds for abortion would be applicable only to abortions performed in the first three
months of pregnancy. DK (1976) 1597, 1608 (Isr.). When a final draft of the bill was brought for second
and third readings, it was the lone voice of MK Pinhas Sheinman that highlighted the continued absence
ofthe twelve-week limitation on abortion approval. DK (1977) 1235 (lsr.). In response, MK Chaika Gross-
man explained that "doctors" and "experts" who appeared before the Committee argued that there was no
need for a time limit on abortion approvals, as all requests for abortion would be screened by a socio-
medical committee. Id. at 1257. This response ended the debate, and there was no other reference to the
issue in other parliamentary deliberations. Id.
74. Draft Bill of Amendment to the Penal Law (Abortions), 5734-1974, in DK (1975) 1334-1335
(Isr.).
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gestation periods. 75 Thus, a legal outline for abortion that took into consideration
the stage of gestation was put on the agenda, but it appears that, in the absence
of a clear conception of rights as an organizing element of the proposed legisla-
tion, this aspect was not given any weight in the dominant discourse surrounding
the bill.
C. The Repeal of the Socioeconomic Clause
These ideological aspects of the debate surrounding the new abortion law
came up again later. The ultra-Orthodox parties adhered to their specific opposi-
tion to the socioeconomic clause and continued to oppose it even after its final
approval by the Knesset in 1977. Under the coalition agreement signed by the
right-wing Likud Party and these parties following the 1977 parliamentary elec-
tions, the ruling Likud Party undertook to abolish the socioeconomic clause that
permitted pregnancy termination due to the harsh familial or social conditions of
the woman or her environs. The provision was defined by the parties to the coa-
lition agreement as deviating from the "status quo on religious matters. '76 A bill
that sought to invalidate the socioeconomic clause under that rationale was
brought before the Knesset and passed into law in 1979.77 Thus, the provision
that the bill's initiators considered to be the most significant means of expanding
women's legal access to abortion was repealed shortly after the law was enacted.
The repeal of the socioeconomic clause created a situation in which the law
was ultimately rendered quite distant from the reality to which it was meant to
respond. As mentioned, relevant data in the 1970s indicated that the majority of
abortions were sought by women who wished to terminate an unintended preg-
nancy due to social, familial, economic, and personal reasons. 78 In fact, these
patterns of pregnancy termination are evident to this day, in Israel and world-
wide: numerous studies attest to the preponderance of such socioeconomic fac-
tors-as opposed to criminal and medical factors-in women's decisions to end
pregnancies. 79 The socioeconomic clause was thus the most important ground
75. Id.
76. DK (1978) 1470 (lsr.) (statement ofMK Kalman Khana). For an explanation of the details and
context of this compromise, see id. at 1471 (statement of Minister of Health Eliezer Shostak).
77. Penal Law, Amendment No. 8, 5740-1979, SH No. 954 p. 40 (Isr.).
78. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
79. A series of studies conducted in the United States since the mid-1980s reveal that women's
reasons for terminating pregnancies have remained consistent over time. The three dominant, recurring
motivations are: economic hardship, lack of readiness for parenting, and partner difficulties. Specifically,
a recent study that involved 1,209 abortion patients found that the two most common reasons cited by
women were "having a baby would dramatically change my life" and "I can't afford a baby now" (cited
by 74% and 73%, respectively). A large proportion of women cited relationship problems or a desire to
avoid single motherhood (48%). Lawrence B. Finer et al., Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions: Quanti-
tative and Qualitative Perspectives, 37 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 110-18 (2005). These
motivations were identified in earlier studies as playing a primary role in American women's decisions to
terminate unintended pregnancies; they correlate with findings from other countries as well. See
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for abortion permitted by the 1977 legislation; its repeal in 1979 undermined the
significance of the entire abortion reform. Moreover, the repeal of the socioeco-
nomic clause had a disparate impact on married women in need of abortion. Due
to religious interests in encouraging "proper" family models, unmarried women
were granted automatic and unrestricted permission to terminate a pregnancy re-
gardless of specific personal, social, or economic circumstances.8" For married
women, on the other hand, the socioeconomic clause had provided the only pos-
sible means of access to an abortion aside from the medical, criminal, and adul-
tery grounds. Thus, following the socioeconomic clause's repeal, the formal
scope of access to abortion for married women was drastically diminished. These
women were left without legal access to abortion in the vast majority of cases in
which they sought to terminate an unwanted pregnancy.8' For married women,
the formal scope of the abortion law became so narrow as to be mostly irrelevant
in terms of responding to their actual reproductive needs.
In 1979, when it became apparent that a majority of legislators planned to
vote for the repeal of the socioeconomic clause, MK Chaika Grossman was out-
raged. She admitted during the final parliamentary deliberations that the current
abortion law, which she had defended intensely just two years prior, was not the
law that she had hoped it would be. Directly addressing one of the members of
the ultra-Orthodox Party, MK Grossman said:
The law that we enacted, I admit it, is not my cup of tea; it was a law of
compromise. You sat in the [Public Services] Committee and you saw
what compromises we made to come up with something that was [in line
with] national consensus. [Now] you are breaking [with] the national
consensus.
82
Akinrinola BanKole, Susheela Singh & Taylor Haas, Reasons Why Women Have Induced Abortions: Ev-
idencefom 27 Countries, 24 INT'L FAM. PLANNING PERSP. 117 (1998); Geraldine Faria, Elwin Barrett &
Linnea Meany Goodman, Women and Abortion: Attitudes, Social Networks, Decision-making, II SOC.
WORK & HEALTH CARE, 85, 85-99 (1985); Sinnika Sihvo et al., Women's Life Cycle and Abortion Deci-
sion in Unintended Pregnancies, 57 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 601, 601-05 (2003); Aida
Torres & Jacqueline Darroch Forrest, Why Do Women Have Abortions?, 20 FAM. PLANNING PERSP. 169,
169-76 (1988).
80. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
81. A study conducted shortly after the Abortion Law was passed by the Knesset in 1977, and
before the repeal of the socioeconomic clause, provides relevant data that support this claim. The study,
which investigated patterns of applications to the Pregnancy Termination Committees among married
women, revealed that most of these women relied on socioeconomic considerations when requesting abor-
tions. Specifically, married women referred to the number of children in their household, the age of their
youngest child, insufficient family income, and housing difficulties as the primary factors affecting their
desire to terminate an unintended pregnancy. PELED & BACKMAN, supra note 46, at 32-33.
82. DK(1979) 1130(lsr.).
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Other members of the Labor Party tried to revive rights-talk, citing the correla-
tion between legal access to abortion and the status of women in society. 83 At
this point, however, it was too late. The same conceptual framework that served
to justify the original bill-that of national and religious concerns devoid of any
regard for individual rights-paved the way for another political compromise.
The repeal of the socioeconomic clause was legitimated by the religious concerns
cited by ultra-Orthodox members of the Knesset. Conservative MKs from the
right-wing Likud Party who were ambivalent about the socioeconomic clause to
begin with (due to national-demographic concerns) sympathized with the reli-
gious demand to abolish this clause altogether. The religious arguments reso-
nated with the Likud MKs' national-demographic concerns regarding birthrates
among Jewish women.84 The scope of the initial abortion reform was delineated
by demographic concerns and religious Jewish concerns about "proper" families
and "proper" children. These same concerns ultimately served as the primary
rationale for the subsequent repeal of the socioeconomic clause.
These developments led to the formulation of abortion legislation that is sim-
ultaneously too narrow and too broad. On the one hand, following the repeal of
the socioeconomic ground out of a complete disregard for women's reproductive
needs and rights, the law became extremely narrow and therefore insufficient in
responding to the actual needs of women (especially married women) seeking to
terminate an undesired pregnancy. On the other hand, in the absence of a clear
conception of rights regarding the status and interests of the fetus, the legislature
enacted a law that is very broad and makes no distinction whatsoever between
the various stages of pregnancy as they pertain to the grounds for abortion. As a
result, the abortion committees were granted unlimited discretion to determine
whether gestation age should be a relevant factor in granting abortion approval.
The following Section explores the various implications of these two problematic
features of Israeli abortion legislation.
83. Shoshana Arbeli Almozlino of the Labor Party argued that this law was "inextricably linked to
the status of the woman in Israel." Id. at 1125. Eliyau Moyal from the same party added that the proposed
amendment to the law was designed to "discriminate against the woman." Id. at 1126.
84. Yael Yishai argues that the religious arguments resonated with the right-wing Likud Party's
vision of Greater Israel. The capture of the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza during the
Six-Day War of 1967 brought more than one million Arabs under Israeli control, in addition to the hun-
dreds of thousands already living in Israel before 1967; this intensified the demographic anxiety and pro-
vided additional justification for abolishing the socioeconomic clause. YISHAI, supra note 4, at 220.
[Vol. 28:327
When Rights Don't Talk
II. WHEN ABORTION LAWS FAIL TO REGULATE
By the late 1980s, it became clear that the repeal of the socioeconomic clause
had failed to produce the expected reduction in the number of abortions per-
formed annually.85 Surveys suggested that the Pregnancy Termination Commit-
tees, which, as the primary enforcement agents of the legislation, were expected
to be the gatekeepers of abortion approvals, were in fact employing lenient ap-
proval policies. 86 The Committees' liberal policies, in turn, contravened the reli-
giously based efforts to reduce the number of abortions. As a result, political
pressure for greater control over the work of these Committees grew. This pres-
sure was particularly focused on Committees in private hospitals, where most
approved abortions took place. 87 In 1989, one of the ultra-Orthodox parties in the
Knesset proposed an additional amendment to the law that aimed to eliminate
the Pregnancy Termination Committees working in private hospitals.88 This pro-
posal was eventually set aside due to internal political developments within the
government coalition.89 When the option of adding another legal restriction to
the legislation became irrelevant, the religious forces in government sought the
intervention of the Minister of Health, who was tasked by law with upholding
the abortion arrangement.9 °
85. SALZBERGER ET AL., supra note 15, at 15; Delila Amir & David Navon, The Politics ofAbortion
in Israel 56 (Pinchas Sapir Ctr. For Dev., Working Paper No. 13-89, 1989). Specifically, the relevant
figures reveal that in 1979, the number of authorized abortions was 15,925. Id. In 1982, this figure in-
creased to 16,829. Id. In 1984, legal abortions reached a record high of 18,948. Id.
86. SALZBERGER ET AL., supra note 15, at 13.
87. Pregnancy Termination Committees operate in Israel in both public and private hospitals. In
private hospitals, a woman seeking an abortion can choose her doctor; accordingly, the cost of the medical
procedure is considerably higher. Relevant data in the 1980s indicated that two-thirds of all authorized
pregnancy terminations were performed in private hospitals. These figures became a source of concern
for religious politicians who suspected that Pregnancy Termination Committees in private hospitals might
employ a more liberal interpretation of the law when granting approval. These suspicions led to the ap-
pointment of yet another abortion committee, the Shenkar Committee, which recommended that all private
hospital committees be abolished. YISHAI, supra note 4, at 221-22; Morag-Levine, supra note 49, at 329-
330. However, a close analysis of these figures indicates that about half of the abortions performed in
private hospitals were approved by public hospitals' abortion committees. For instance, in 1988, private
hospitals approved 5,352 pregnancy terminations but performed 10,047 of the 15,255 total abortions per-
formed that year. This pattern was evident in subsequent years as well. See CENTRAL BUREAU OF
STATISTICS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF ISRAEL no. 42, §3.25 (1991). These latter figures suggest that
women who could afford the extra cost preferred private hospitals not because of a more liberal approval
policy employed there, but simply because they offered better medical care.
88. This draft bill linked the licensing of Pregnancy Termination Committees in private hospitals
to the specific approval of the Ministry of Health. See Draft Bill of Amendment to the Penal Law (Amend-
ment No. 30), 5749-1989, HH No. 1950 (Isr.).
89. The proposal passed only the first vote in the Knesset and was then shelved. YISHAI, supra note
4, at 228.
90. Section 321 of the Penal Law provides that the Minister of Health is responsible for upholding
the abortion provisions of the Penal Law. This section authorizes the Minister to issue administrative
regulations for the proper implementation of this arrangement. Penal Law, 5737-1977, SH No. 864 p. 226
(Isr.).
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A. The Re-emergence of Socioeconomic Considerations
In 1991, the Minister of Health appointed a public commission known as the
Riftin Commission to examine the manner of enforcement of the Penal Law sec-
tions pertaining to abortion approval by the Pregnancy Termination Committees.
After one year of data collection, analysis, and deliberations, the Riftin Commis-
sion submitted its final report, which included specific recommendations regard-
ing oversight of the approval policies of Pregnancy Termination Committees in
both private and public hospitals.9 1 The specific tasks of the Commission, as out-
lined in the introduction to its report, indicate that the central concern motivating
this public inquiry was the wide variation in the approval policies of the different
Pregnancy Termination Committees. 92 As part of its investigation into the oper-
ation of these Committees, the Riftin Commission examined 743 cases heard by
the Pregnancy Termination Committees in various hospitals.
The main problem identified by the Riftin Commission pertained to the
fourth ground for abortion permitted by Section 316(a)(4) of the Penal Law:
where "continuation of the pregnancy may .... cause physical or mental harm
to the woman." 93 The Riftin Commission found a significant discrepancy be-
tween the Committees' decisions to approve abortions and the formal require-
ments of the law. In all but one of the hospitals examined, the Pregnancy Termi-
nation Committees used this section to grant approval for abortions in cases in
which the grounds were in fact socioeconomic, not medical. Over 70% of appli-
cations to the Committees citing "mental harm" were actually based on socioec-
onomic circumstances.94 This finding implied that, in practice, the Committees
relied exclusively on circumstances of social or economic hardship as an indica-
tion that a pregnancy might endanger the woman's mental health.
A similar discrepancy-though at a significantly lower rate-between the
letter of the law and actual decisions to grant approval for abortion was also
found with respect to Subsection 316(a)(3), which deals with concerns for the
health of the fetus. 95 In this context, the Riftin Commission determined that the
Pregnancy Termination Committees were lenient with regard to the type of med-
ical documentation required to establish the existence of circumstances that
would justify abortion due to physical or mental defects in the fetus. In sum, the
91. Report of the Commission for Examining the Implementation of the Penal Law (1992),
http://www.health.gov.il/PublicationsFiles/riptin.pdf [hereinafter Riftin Commission Report] (examining
the implementation of sections in the Penal Law that pertain to pregnancy termination).
92. Specifically, the Commission was given three tasks: (1) to examine the operating procedures
of the Pregnancy Termination Committees in public and private hospitals; (2) to examine the level of
suitability of such procedures to the provisions of the law; and (3) to examine the involvement of physi-
cians who were members of these Committees in the actual performance of abortions. Id. at 1.
93. Penal Law, 5737-1977, SH No. 864 p. 226 (Isr.).
94. See Riftin Commission Report, supra note 91, at 5.
95. The discrepancy with regard to this ground amounted to 41% on average, ranging from 45% in
private hospitals to 39% in public hospitals. Id. at 4-5.
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Riftin Commission found that there was a gap between the formal requirements
of the law and the actual circumstances that motivated the Committees' decision-
making with regard to both the medical-mental ground and the fetal health
ground.
Thus, in 1992, it became clear that the socioeconomic ground, despite being
formally stricken from the law in 1979, actually continued to serve as a signifi-
cant basis for abortions in Israel. Furthermore, the picture drawn by the Riftin
Commission was one in which the Pregnancy Termination Committees that were
designed to serve as the law's enforcers had in fact become key players in re-
drawing the legal boundaries of abortion approvals. Instead of serving as tech-
nical enforcement bureaucracies, these Committees began expanding access to
abortion by formulating circumventing routes based on a very broad and flexible
interpretation of the phrase "mental harm" used in the law. In the absence of a
legal path for a significant number of women seeking abortions, and in light of
what appears to have been the medical community's desire to secure medically
safe abortions for women, alternative mechanisms for abortion approval were
gradually created. These mechanisms were implemented parallel to the law ra-
ther than within it. Instead of driving women who sought abortions based on
socioeconomic considerations to receive abortions "underground" and without
proper medical supervision, the Committees created a way for these women to
obtain their approval for (il)legal abortions.9 6
A similar explanation likely applies to the second significant finding of the
Riftin Commission, relating to the ground for abortion based on fetal defects. In
this context as well, it appears that the practice indicated by the Commission-
whereby Pregnancy Termination Committees practiced relative leniency when
granting abortion approvals based on this ground-was done in order to address
the intolerable gap between the narrow letter of the law and women's real and
broad need for safe, accessible abortion. It would thus seem that under the pretext
of "risk to the health of the fetus," any woman seeking to terminate an unwanted
pregnancy was able to do so. In such cases, the women likely obtained some
medical certificate attesting to their having taken a certain medication or having
undergone medical treatments not recommended for pregnant women. The Com-
mittees would then base their decisions to approve abortions on said documen-
tation, without further medical inquiries.
97
96. This pattern of disguising socioeconomic circumstances in the women's health ground was
identifiable immediately after the repeal of the socioeconomic clause. In 1979, the only full year in which
the socioeconomic clause was in effect, 6,331 pregnancy terminations (out of a total of 15,925) were
performed based on this ground, and only 1,299 were based on the women's health ground. In 1982, when
the socioeconomic ground was no longer a legal ground for abortion, 5,796 of abortions (out of a total of
16,829) were based on the women's health ground. Amir & Navon, supra note 85, at 85. Hence, in a
period of two years following the repeal of the socioeconomic clause, the women's health ground became
the central ground upon which pregnancy terminations were approved, clearly replacing the repealed so-
cioeconomic ground.
97. My personal experience attests to this conclusion. In 1989, as a young married woman, I expe-
rienced an unintended pregnancy, and was unable to meet any official criteria for a legal abortion. My
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In both instances, it can be assumed that the law-circumventing routes de-
veloped by the Committees were aimed primarily at accommodating the needs
of married women. While unmarried women were granted automatic and unre-
stricted permission to terminate pregnancies, the vast majority of married women
who sought to terminate pregnancies depended on the availability of socioeco-
nomic grounds for abortion. Thus, the needs of married women appear to have
been the primary reason for the lenient approval policies developed by the Preg-
nancy Termination Committees following the official repeal of the socioeco-
nomic clause.
The Riftin Commission was severely critical of this situation, in which it
found "no compatibility between the decision to approve abortions and the pro-
visions of the Law." 98 The Commission recommended a number of significant
changes in the operation of the Committees, with the intent of creating said com-
patibility. Interestingly, the report refrained from discussing the circumstances
that might have induced the development of these law-circumventing routes and
focused exclusively on outlining a set of recommendations designed to reinforce
the exclusion of socioeconomic considerations from the deliberations of the
Pregnancy Termination Committees. The Commission's main recommendation
was as follows: in cases in which claims were made regarding risk to the
woman's mental health, such claims must be based on the written opinion of an
expert psychiatrist and must include a diagnosis of a recognized clinical psychi-
atric disorder (such as postpartum psychosis). 99 The Commission thus sought to
significantly narrow the Committees' interpretation of the "mental grounds" for
abortion to include only circumstances where it could be clinically established
that the woman suffered from a recognized psychiatric disorder. The goal was to
prevent the Pregnancy Termination Committees from granting approval for abor-
tions in cases where it appeared that a correlation could exist between the
woman's socioeconomic condition and mental distress. A similar recommenda-
tion to the one aimed at reducing the number of abortion approvals based on
medical grounds was also formulated regarding the fetal defect ground. 00
The Rifin Commission's recommendations were adopted by the Minister of
Health shortly after the publication of the Commission's report. The Minister of
Health, who is tasked by law with upholding the abortion arrangement, is author-
ized to issue administrative regulations for the proper implementation of the
law. 01 1 These regulations are issued by the Director General of the Ministry of
Health in the form of official directives. In 1993, a Director General's directive
only option for obtaining a Committee's approval for pregnancy termination was to obtain a medical cer-
tificate that indicated that I took some medication that is not recommended for pregnant women due to a
potential risk to the fetus.
98. Riftin Commission Report, supra note 91, at 7.
99. Id. at 6-7.
100. [d. at 7.
101. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 28:327
When Rights Don't Talk
embraced the Riflin Commission's recommendations as formal Ministry pol-
icy. 102 The directive stressed that this newly announced policy must be "strictly
and consistently performed."' 10 3 Thus, as of 1993, legal access to abortion had
been narrowed through stricter limitations on the discretion of the Pregnancy
Termination Committees. The political impetus for this move was quite clear.
The Riftin Commission was appointed in response to political pressures by the
religious forces in government. Hence, the Minister of Health, in his role as the
government official in charge of regulating the approval policies of the Commit-
tees, was politically committed to strict enforcement of the law. The govem-
ment's coalition agreement with the ultra-Orthodox parties left no room for so-
cial and economic grounds for abortion approvals following their repeal in 1979.
While the Pregnancy Termination Committees appeared to have been concerned
with the actual reproductive needs of women seeking abortions-and particu-
larly with the needs of married women-and therefore tried to accommodate as
many abortion requests as possible within the existing legislation, the Minister
of Health appeared to have been primarily concerned with restricting abortion
requests that were not explicitly permitted by the law. This begs the question:
how did the Minister's intervention in the work of the Pregnancy Termination
Committees in order to draw narrower boundaries for abortion approvals affect
married women's access to legal abortion in cases of unwanted pregnancy?
A detailed analysis of data regarding changes in the scope and characteristics
of abortion approvals from the early 1990s through today provides an intriguing
answer to this question. While the Minister's directive, based on the recommen-
dations of the Riftin Commission, succeeded in reducing the number of abortion
approvals based on medical grounds, this move did not achieve its ultimate goal
of reducing the total number of abortion approvals granted. Indeed, official ref-
erence to medical grounds clearly declined following the Minister's intervention.
However, other grounds for abortion became more popular over the following
years, providing alternative legal paths for married women seeking to terminate
unwanted pregnancies. The following Section discusses the substance and sig-
nificance of these findings.
B. The Rise of the Adulterous Woman
The most recent official data regarding pregnancy termination in Israel, pub-
lished by the Ministry of Health, indicate that the primary official reason for
which women in Israel terminate pregnancies is pregnancy out of wedlock.1"4
102. Director General Directive 23/93 Compliance with the Law and Regulations by the Pregnancy
Committees, Operational Guidelines, Ministry of Health, Israel (Nov. 14, 1993),
http://www.health.gov.il/hozer/mk23_1993.pdf.
103. Id.
104. Pregnancy Terminations by the Law, 1990-2014, DATA DIVISION, MINISTRY OF HEALTH 11-
15 (Dec. 2015), http://www.health.gov.il/publicationsfiles/pregl990_2014.pdf.
2017]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
More than half of abortions in 2014 were performed in accordance with Section
316(a)(2) of the Penal Law.105 Although this Section includes the grounds of rape
and incest.as well as the "out of wedlock" ground, the Ministry's report itself
clarifies that abortion approvals based on this section are mostly attributed to
pregnancy out of wedlock.10 6 This fact is also compatible with general data indi-
cating that rape and incest constitute a very small portion of the cases in which
women request abortions. 0 7 Moreover, according to the Ministry of Health's
statistics, nearly half of the annual abortion approvals are granted to married
women. This figure has remained relatively constant over time and generally
ranges between 41% and 45%. 108 Considered together, these two facts-that the
most popular ground for legal abortion is the one pertaining to pregnancies con-
ceived out of wedlock, and that nearly half of the applicants for abortions are
married women-are particularly revealing. Given that a large portion of the
women who received legal abortions in Israel in the past two and half decades
were married, and assuming that, in most instances, the reason for abortion was
social, and not medical or criminal, one is led to conclude that a woman seeking
a legal abortion would be compelled to frame her reasoning in terms that conform
to the precise letter of the law. Of the four available grounds provided in the
law-the woman's age, pregnancy out of wedlock, the woman's health, and the
fetus' health-the main ground that currently allows for some leeway for appli-
cants is "pregnancy out of wedlock." This ground is open not only to single
women, but also to married women who have had extramarital sexual relations,
or to those who claim to have done so in order to obtain the desired abortion
approval.
An extremely high proportion (53.1%) of abortion approvals are granted
based on this ground. This seems to attest to the fact that some of the married
women seeking to terminate an unwanted pregnancy find refuge in this provision
and are compelled to lie about the nature of their pregnancy in order to obtain
105. Specifically, the Report reveals that 53.1% of all pregnancy terminations in 2014 were ap-
proved based on the "out of wedlock" ground. In absolute numbers, this amounted to 10,330 abortions out
of a total of 19,356. Id.
106. While mentioning Section 316(a)(2) of the Penal Law as the official legal ground for approv-
ing this type of request for abortion, the Report refers to "out of wedlock" as the specific category in the
section on which these requests may be approved. 1d.
107. This fact was also acknowledged by the Minister of Health back in 1975. While presenting
the proposed abortion reform in the Knesset, the Minister explained: "It is an open secret that only a small
portion of abortion[s] are performed due to legal grounds such as rape.... Most [women] ... terminate
an out of wedlock pregnancy or unintended pregnancy." DK (1975) 1322 (Isr.). Studies in the United
States reveal similar data regarding the marginality of criminally related reasons for abortion. A compre-
hensive study in the United States that involved 1,209 abortion patients found that rape accounted for 1%
of reasons for abortion and incest for less than 0.5%. These figures remain unchanged over time. See Finer
et al., supra note 79, at 113.
108. Pregnancy Terminations by the Law, supra note 104, at 40. Earlier data from the late 1970s
and 1980s indicate that this has always been the case. Delila Amir and David Navon's study of 489 abor-
tion requests handled by Pregnancy Termination Committees from 1978 to 1986 reveals that, ever since
the enactment of the reformed abortion law, married women have constituted nearly half of the applicants
to the Committees. Amir & Navon, supra note 85, at 52.
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the desired approval. It appears that a false statement whereby the pregnancy is
declared to be the result of extramarital intercourse is currently the primary path
available to married women seeking abortion approval from the Pregnancy Ter-
mination Committees. It should be noted that this conclusion is supported not
only by statistical data respecting the centrality of the "pregnancy out of wed-
lock" ground within the total approvals granted for abortions annually, but also
by anecdotal information gathered over the years from women who actually un-
derwent this procedure and confessed anonymously in various media reports that
lies about adultery paved their way to legal abortion.
0 9
Alongside the ground of pregnancy out of wedlock, one-fifth of pregnancy
terminations are performed for reasons relating to the woman's health. 110 This is
a relatively high rate compared to other developed countries. While in the United
States pregnancy terminations due to concerns for the health of the mother ac-
count for approximately 10% of legal abortions,"' in Israel the rate is almost
double that. Such data may also indicate that married women seeking to termi-
nate an unwanted pregnancy find some degree of refuge in this provision as well,
even in cases that do not meet the psychiatric standard that is currently imposed
by the Minister of Health's directive. An official report that was recently pub-
lished by the State Comptroller's Office confirms this assumption and deter-
mines that some abortion committees refrain from demanding official psychiatric
evaluation of a pregnant woman as required by the Minister of Health's directive,
instead accepting as sufficient the woman's own testimony that she suffers from
mental distress as a result of the pregnancy. 12 Several other committees view a
letter from a family doctor as sufficient, rather than one from a registered psy-
chiatrist. '13 However, although there may be a limited trend of leniency regard-
ing this provision, it is important to note that the Minister's directive-which
limited the Committees' discretion with regard to the mental health ground and
required a clinical diagnosis of a recognized psychiatric disorder for abortion
approval-did lead to a significant decline in such abortions. The number of
109. See, e.g., Einat Sagi Alfasa, What's the Problem? Lie and Say the Pregnancy is Not From
Your Husband, YNET (May 2, 2013), http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4374951,00.html; Roni
Linder-Ganz, The Right to Have an Abortion Without Being Interrogated, HA'ARETZ (Nov. 15, 2013),
http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/iphone-article/.premium-1.2166226; Aviva Lori, Lies I Told the Commit-
tee, HA'ARETZ (Aug. 8, 2007), http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.1127665; Sagit Pasteman, Abortion in Is-
rael: Why Women Have to Lie?, SALOONA (Oct. 21, 2013), http://sa-




110. The exact figure was 18.6% in 2014. Pregnancy Terminations by the Law, supra note 104, at
14.
111. For instance, 12% of women surveyed in 2004 in the United States reported that they decided
to have an abortion because of a "physical problem with my health." Finer et al., supra note 79, at 113.
112. The Office of the State Comptroller examined the work of the abortion committees for a period
of several months in 2014 and 2015. Its findings were published as part of its 2015 annual report. See
STATE COMPTROLLER OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 695 (2016).
113. Id.
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abortions in this category per 1,000 women of reproductive age has decreased by
50% since 1990.114 This is the most dramatic decrease recorded regarding any of
the grounds for abortion approval. There can be no doubt that the Minister's di-
rective played a decisive role in prompting this change. 115
Additional official data further support the assumption that, rather than using
the medical ground, married women now mostly rely on the "out of wedlock"
ground in their efforts to obtain legal abortions. Perusal of the trends in abortion
approvals granted over the years shows a significant increase in the relative rate
of use of the "out of wedlock" ground as compared to other grounds. While in
1990, before the Minister's directive went into effect, pregnancy terminations
based on the "out of wedlock" ground constituted 41.4% of all pregnancy termi-
nations, by 2014 this figure had increased to 53.1%.116 The most significant in-
crease occurred in the years following the Minister's directive that restricted the
discretion of the Committees with regard to the woman's mental health
ground.1 17 Moreover, the relative rate of abortion approvals based on the "out of
wedlock" ground increased parallel to the relative decrease in the rate of approv-
als based on the woman's mental health ground.1 18 There appears to be a clear
correlation between these two trends. This fact, in turn, further supports the con-
clusion that the main refuge of married women seeking to terminate an unwanted
pregnancy through existing legal mechanisms is currently found in the ground of
pregnancy "out of wedlock." In the absence of any other available legal ground
not based on medical or criminal circumstances, many married women are ap-
parently compelled to make false statements regarding the circumstances of their
pregnancies, and the medical community is apparently inclined to accept these
statements to provide safe pregnancy termination procedures in established med-
ical institutions to this large group of women.
In sum, following the intervention of the Minister of Health in the work of
the Committees in the early 1990s, the efforts made by the Pregnancy Termina-
114. Pregnancy Terminations by the Law, supra note 104, at 13. Reproductive age is defined as
between 15 and 49.
115. It should be noted that the overall decrease in the rate of usage of the woman's health provision
greatly surpasses the general decrease in the total number of pregnancy terminations performed per capita
since the 1990s, which stands at 26%. Moreover, the most dramatic decrease in the rate of usage of the
woman's health provision was recorded between 1990 and 2000, the decade that immediately followed
the issuance of the Minister's Directive. Id. One can therefore draw a link between the Minister's inter-
vention in the Committees' work with regard to the woman's mental health provision and the dramatic
decrease in the use of this ground by the Pregnancy Termination Committees as a legal justification for
abortion approval.
116. Id. at 14. This change amounted to an increase of 60% in the number of abortions performed
based on this ground (6,417 in 1990 as opposed to 10,330 in 2014). Idat 15.
117. in 1990, 41.4% of abortion approvals were based on "out of wedlock" considerations. In 1995,
this number increased to 47.8%, and in 1999 it reached a record high of 54%. This figure has remained
relatively steady since then. Id.
118. In the decade between 1990 and 2000, the relative percentage of abortions based on the
woman's health ground decreased from 27.5% to 19%, while the parallel figure for "out of wedlock"
pregnancy terminations increased from 41.4% to 53.9%. Id. at 14.
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tion Committees to expand married women's legal access to pregnancy termina-
tion, previously focused on the medical ground, were diverted to the pregnancy
"out of wedlock" ground. This ground has become the primary law-circumvent-
ing route for abortion approval today, largely replacing the old circumvention
routes of the 1980s.
C. Viability Becomes an Additional Criterion for Abortion Approval
In 1994, a year after his first attempt to discipline the Committees by limiting
their discretion regarding the woman's mental health ground for abortion, the
Minister of Health again intervened and introduced another significant change to
the abortion approval procedure. As opposed to the first intervention, however,
it appears that this time the Minister acted in response to a request from the Com-
mittees themselves, rather than as part of the struggle to enforce the abortion
legislation. In another Director General's directive, the head of the Medical Ser-
vices Division in the Ministry of Health restricted the authority of the Pregnancy
Termination Committees in dealing with late-term abortions.' 19 Specifically, it
was determined that the Committees could approve an abortion request only
when it involved a pregnancy of no more than twenty-three weeks. 2 0 With re-
gard to the approval procedure for later-term abortions, the new directive ordered
the establishment of six Higher Regional Boards, each consisting of five mem-
bers. 2' These new boards were granted exclusive authority to approve requests
for late-term pregnancy terminations.
Thus, that which the legislature initially refrained from doing--determining
whether the stage of gestation and fetal viability should be relevant considera-
tions in abortion approvals-was ultimately done by the Minister of Health
through an administrative directive. This directive established a new medical fo-
rum, the Higher Regional Boards (mention of which is not found in the existing
law), to deliberate on late-term abortions where questions relating to fetal viabil-
ity were pertinent. The authority of the Pregnancy Termination Committees was
thus restricted again, contrary to the language of the law, and they were denied
authority to approve requests for abortion in cases involving pregnancies of more
than twenty-three weeks. This directive went into effect in 1995, and with it, yet
another law-circumventing route was paved as the result of the Ministry of
Health's intervention in the substantive content of the law.
It may be assumed that this directive was the fruit of collaboration between
the Pregnancy Termination Committees and the Minister of Health. The absence
of any reference to viability in the language of the law had left the Committees
119. Director General, Directive 76/94: Higher Regional Boards for Pregnancy Terminations in
Pregnancies of More than 23 weeks, Ministry of Health (Dec. 28, 1994),
http://www.health.gov.il/hozer/mk23_2007.pdf.
120. Id. at 2.
121. Id. at 1.
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without any normative guidance as to how to exercise discretion regarding late-
term abortions. While the most liberal European legislation at the time granted
discretion respecting late-term abortions to a special medical forum, 2 2 Israeli
legislation did not distinguish between first-trimester abortions and last-trimester
abortions, thus presenting the Committees with difficult cases of late-term abor-
tion requests. In such a state of affairs, it may be assumed that the initiative to
establish a new organ with expertise in dilemmas regarding late-term abortions
came directly from the Committees themselves. Support for this assumption is
found in the fact that the new directive regarding the establishment of the Higher
Regional Boards was accepted and enforced by the Pregnancy Termination Com-
mittees immediately after its publication. While the scope and substance of the
women's mental health ground became a battleground between the Minister of
Health and the Committees, and contemporary data suggest that the Committees
partly resist the instructions of the Minister in that context, 123 there is no parallel
evidence regarding the establishment of the Higher Regional Boards.
The new boards began to operate immediately after the Minister's order,
without any documented resistance from the local Committees. At the same time,
despite the perceived cooperation of the Committees in implementing the new
directive, it should be acknowledged that the establishment of the Higher Re-
gional Boards was not a mere procedural matter deriving from the Minister of
Health's technical enforcement authority under the law.' 24 It constituted a sub-
stantial intervention in the existing legal abortion arrangement, including the es-
tablishment of a new organ not mentioned in the law. It also constituted an ex-
plicit violation of the authority of the Pregnancy Termination Committees, which
were granted the exclusive authority to approve pregnancy terminations by Knes-
set legislation.
The Minister of Health was apparently aware of this difficulty when estab-
lishing the Higher Regional Boards. In 2007, in an attempt to resolve some of
the problems involved in the Minister's intervention in the work of the Commit-
tees, officials at the Ministry of Health issued yet another directive, whose pur-
pose was to reaffirm and expand the previous guidelines respecting the establish-
ment of the Higher Regional Boards. 125 In its preamble, this new directive
declared that the "Ministry of Health's instructions are in accordance with the
Penal Law, and do not derogate or change its provisions." 126 In an attempt to
reconcile the establishment of the Higher Regional Boards with the provisions
of the law, the guidelines went on to clarify that the new boards actually consti-
tuted ordinary three-member Pregnancy Termination Committees to which two
122. See supra note 72.
123. See supra notes 10-115 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 90.
125. Director General Directive 23/07: Pregnancy Termination Committees in the Stage of Viabil-
ity, Ministry of Health (Dec. 19, 2007), http://www.health.gov.il/hozer/mk23-2007.pdf.
126. Id. at 1.
[Vol. 28:327
When Rights Don't Talk
members were added in the capacity of "advisors., 127 Thus it stated that neither
the deliberations of the Higher Regional Boards nor resolutions regarding preg-
nancy termination could be executed except in the presence of official Commit-
tee members, whose positions were decisive. In so doing, the Minister brought
the arrangement of the previous directive considerably closer to the language of
the law and partially resolved the difficulty.
At the same time, additional instructions created a new set of problems re-
garding the authority of the Minister of Health and the thin line between enforc-
ing the law and circumventing it. The new directive provided that, since the
Higher Regional Boards were to deliberate on questions of viability-stage abor-
tion, they required special criteria for approving late-term abortion requests, dif-
ferent from the ordinary criteria provided by the law. 28 Specifically, the directive
provided that, in late-term abortions where the legal ground for abortion is the
woman's age, risk to the woman's health, illicit intercourse, or pregnancy out of
wedlock, abortion approval shall only be granted in exceptional cases and based
on weighty considerations. 129 With regard to the legal ground involving risk to
the fetus' health, abortion may only be approved in cases of concern for severe
developmental or physical disability. 130 In an attempt to justify these substantive
additions to the abortion legislation, the directive went on to explain that "at the
time the Law was legislated, the option of terminating a pregnancy during the
viability stage, in the sense of causing the stillborn delivery of a viable fetus, was
not available."' 31 Moreover, the directive clarified that reference to viability in
any legal abortion regime is essential and that "there are Westem countries
where, despite strict protection of individual rights, pregnancy termination in the
viability stage is banned or subject to stringent criteria." 132
Indeed, the viability stage and its impact on the scope of legal abortion is an
issue that many Western countries addressed when formulating their legal ar-
rangements regarding pregnancy termination. However, as shown in the first part
of this Article, these facts were known to the Israeli legislature. Alongside the
abortion bill eventually approved by the Knesset, there was another bill by MK
127. Id. at 3.
128. The Directive provides:
Pregnancy termination following approval of a pregnancy termination board during the viabil-
ity stage means termination of the pregnancy after performance of medical procedures intended
to ensure that the fetus is delivered stillbom. The will of the mother, though it should be re-
spected, is not an exclusive and decisive consideration when deciding whether to approve ter-
mination during the viability stage, and other considerations as detailed hereunder must be
considered even in cases where, in terms oJ the Law, there exist permitted grounds for preg-
nancy termination.
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
129. Id.
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Marcia Freedman, which centered on Roe v. Wade's central holding. 133 Accord-
ingly, MK Freedman explicitly referred to stages of pregnancy in her bill, distin-
guishing between first-trimester abortions and late-term abortions and subjecting
the latter to a series of restrictions. Furthermore, after Freedman's proposal was
set aside, several Members of the Knesset urged their colleagues to restrict the
proposed grounds for abortion suggested by the Social Services Committee to
first-trimester abortions. However, these suggestions were mostly ignored.1 34
Thus, when the Israeli legislature formulated the existing abortion legislation, its
members were well aware of the Western world's constitutional agenda, which
included the acknowledgment of the potential impact of the viability stage on
legislation regarding pregnancy termination. Nonetheless, the Israeli legislature
disregarded this aspect of abortion legislation, since the primary concern of the
majority of the Members of the Knesset in the 19 70s was the promotion of the
interests of the Jewish collective, rather than the rights of individuals in society.
This led to the enactment of legislation that was simultaneously too narrow (with
respect to the rights and needs of women) and too broad (with respect to relevant
interests or rights pertaining to the fetus), and therefore unenforceable.
It can thus be argued that the same problematic aspects of the law that moti-
vated the Pregnancy Termination Commnittees to develop law-circumventing
routes for expanding married women's access to abortion also inspired the regu-
lation of late-term abortion by the Minister of Health. In this respect, the current
regulatory regime and the scope and substance of abortion approval are not gov-
erned by the law itself, but are rather determined by enforcement mechanisms
that were developed by the law's enforcement agents but exist outside the law.
What appears to be a legal abortion in Israel is in fact an illegal one. This under-
standing serves as a starting point for the following Section, in which the relevant
lessons from the Israeli case are brought to bear on the American debate regard-
ing the benefits of abortion compromises. In an attempt to further highlight the
importance of a guiding framework of rights for developing proper abortion pol-
icies, the following Section also broadens the comparative analysis and discusses
developments in abortion legislation in Canada, Germany, and France.
III. ABORTIONS BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE COMPROMISES AND RIGHTS-TALK
In 1973, when the United States Supreme Court announced its decision in
Roe v. Wade, it appeared to be a stunning victory for American women. The
Court ruled that the right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment extended to a woman's decision to have an abortion. 135For
133. Draft Bill of Amendment to the Penal Law (Abortions) 5734-1974, in DK (1975) 1334-1335
(Isr.).
134. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
135. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For a more detailed analysis of the central holding of Roe
v. Wade, see supra note 7.
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Israeli pro-choice advocates, Roe v. Wade represented a legal framework for
abortion to which Israeli women could not be given access, in light of the signif-
icant compromises required as part of the give-and-take process in the legisla-
ture. In the absence of an Israeli constitutional bill of rights, the formation of
abortion legislation depended exclusively on a majoritarian process in the legis-
lature that was shielded from judicial review. Meanwhile, Roe v. Wade itself soon
seemed to stimulate rather than discourage antiabortion measures. In the four
decades that have passed since the ruling, numerous efforts have been made in
Congress and state legislatures to curtail women's access to abortion. 136 Some of
these initiatives were upheld by the Court and became effective in restricting
access to abortion for a large number of women, especially poor women, minors,
and rural women.1 37 When the breadth and scope of the political controversy
prompted by Roe v. Wade became clear, some legal scholars started to question
the wisdom of Roe v. Wade, and to posit the superiority of a conciliatory legisla-
tive process of deliberation and compromise that is not centered on rights.
38
A. The Quest for Legislative Compromises
Roe v. Wade was not decided in a vacuum. In the early 1970s, there was a
distinct trend toward abortion law reform in several states.1 39 As it became clear
that Roe v. Wade's judicial intervention in this process had exacerbated, not re-
solved, the conflict over abortion, some legal scholars started to wonder whether
Roe v. Wade unwisely undermined a pattern of legislative changes taking place
across the nation. Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote one of the earliest feminist cri-
tiques of Roe's judicially imposed approach to abortion, describing legislative
trends as a positive process in which "majoritarian institutions were listening and
acting."' t4 Reflecting on arguments in favor of a legislative solution to abortion
136. For one of the earliest feminist accounts of the scope and significance of Roe's controversy
and its impact on women's access to abortion, see Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy
and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REv. 375 (1985). For more recent accounts of state
and federal legislative attempts to restrict women's access to abortion, see sources listed in supra note 8.
137. For a funding restriction approved by the Court, see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
For restrictions on the use of state funds, facilities, and employees in performing, assisting with, or coun-
seling on abortion, see Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). In 1992, the Court
rejected the trimester framework that was developed in Roe and replaced it with the "undue burden" stand-
ard for abortion restrictions. Using the new standard, the Court upheld parental notification requirements
and waiting period requirements. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 899, 886-87 (1992). The Court also upheld restrictions on second-trimester pre-viability abor-
tions. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
138. Sylvia Law characterized the emergence of these trends in legal scholarship as "[t]he hunger
for compromise." Sylvia Law, Abortion Compromise-Inevitable and Impossible, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV.
921,932.
139. Ginsburg, supra note 136, at 379-80.
140. Id. at 385.
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that predated Roe v. Wade, Ginsburg concluded that a democratic solution to
abortion at the legislature would be preferable to a judicially imposed one.1 41
Ginsburg's arguments were thoroughly developed in the late 1980s and early
1990s through the lens of comparative research in the work of Mary Ann Glen-
don. 142 Inspired by the relative calm of abortion politics outside of the United
States, Glendon conducted a search for alternatives by comparing abortion laws
in twenty Western countries. Highlighting the benefits of strategic legislative
compromises in this arena, Glendon argued that abortion reforms that were the
products of the give-and-take of the legislative process brought about "humane,
democratic compromise[s]" 143 and proved that "a divided society can compro-
mise successfully on the abortion issue." 144 Her study revealed that most coun-
tries that reformed their abortion laws at the time took what Glendon termed "a
middle position" on abortion. 145 Although Israel was not included in Glendon's
study, her description of "a middle position" clearly resembled the Israeli legal
framework: one which disapproves of abortion in principle, but permits it under
circumstances deemed by the legislature to be "good causes." In reference to this
type of legal model, Glendon argued that "in practice, in most of these countries
it now seems quite easy for a woman legally to terminate an unwanted pregnancy
in the first trimester." 146 Glendon concluded that, in contrast to legislative com-
promises on abortion in other countries, Roe v. Wade's judicially imposed,
rights-based approach to abortion has foreclosed the prospect of further statutory
developments. 1
47
In a later work entitled Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Dis-
course, Glendon focused more generally on the American preoccupation with
individual rights and argued that rights talk "inhibits dialogue that might lead
toward consensus, accommodation, or at least the discovery of common
ground.''148 Referring to abortion as one telling example of this problem, Glen-
don argued that constitutionalizing the abortion issue produced the worst of all
possible solutions in that it left women their constitutional right to privacy, but
little else.'4 9 In contrast, "compromise legislation"'50 in other Western countries
141. Specifically, she referred to the view of Second Circuit Judge Henry J. Friendly, who argued
as early as 1970 in favor of the "superiority of the legislative solution" when describing what transpired
when New York reformed its abortion law that year. Id. at 385-86.
142. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
(1991); GLENDON, supra note 3.
143. GLENDON, supra note 3, at 18.
144. Id. at 19.
145. Id. at 13.
146. Id. Interestingly, this conclusion was later endorsed with reference to Israel as well. In one of
a few commentaries that analyzed Israel's abortion legislation, Noga Morag Levine, inspired by Glendon's
framework of analysis, concluded that "Israeli [w]omen seem to have, for the most part, benefited from
the terms of the Israeli abortion [c]ompromise." Morag-Levine, supra note 49, at 333.
147. GLENDON, supra note 3, at 24-25.
148. GLENDON, supra note 142, at 14.
149. Id. at 65.
150. Id. at 58.
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gave substantial protection to women's interests, including public funding for
abortion and social support for maternity and child-raising. Deepening her pre-
vious comparative analysis, Glendon focused specifically on the German 151 and
Canadian' 5 2 solutions and argued that these countries' legal solutions to abortion
were superior to the American solution, since they placed greater reliance on
legislation and compromise to create rules governing abortion.
Other commentators who surveyed abortion politics in Western countries
reached similar conclusions, highlighting the benefits of legislative compro-
mise. 153 However, some legislative solutions to abortion, such as the German
legislative scheme, were criticized for being incoherent from a strict rights per-
spective. 154 Nevertheless, there appears to be a consensus among scholars en-
gaged in comparative analysis that women ultimately benefit from the terms of
legislative compromises on abortion that are not strictly rights-based, since com-
promise-based solutions usually lead to increased access to publicly funded legal
abortions while judicially created, rights-based regimes like the United States'
do not.
Robin West's work joins the call for legislative and policy solutions to abor-
tion, but from a different perspective.155 West's work focuses specifically on the
feminist costs that result from reliance on adjudication and constitutional rights
talk as the strategic vehicle for achieving legal abortion. Writing from a feminist
and pro-choice perspective, West argues that conceptualizing legal abortion as
an individual negative constitutional right and relying on adjudication as the stra-
tegic vehicle for developing and justifying this right has not served women
well. 156 With Roe v. Wade on the books, abortion is becoming less and less avail-
able as the result of political and legislative decisions that are made far away
from the Court. 5 7 Moreover, rather than promoting reproductive justice, the con-
stitutional right to choose to have an abortion undermines the case for protecting
the positive reproductive needs of men and women. These critical insights lead
West to conclude that "engaged politics and civil compromise" on abortion at
151. Id.at63-66.
152. Id. at 164-67.
153. Mary Ann Case, Perfectionism and Fundamentalism in the Application ofthe German Abor-
tion Law, in CONSTITUTING EQUALITY: GENDER EQUALITY AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
93 (Susan E. Williams ed., 2011); Ofrit Liviatan, Competing Fundamental Values: Comparing Law's Role
in American and Western European Conflicts over Abortion, in LAW, RELIGION, CONSTITUTION:
FREEDOM OF RELIGION, EQUAL TREATMENT, AND THE LAW 385 (W. Cole Durham, Jr. et al. eds., 2013);
Joyce Outshoom, The Stability of Compromise: Abortion Politics in Western Europe, in ABORTION
POLITICS: PUBLIC POLICY IN CROSS CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 145 (Marianne Githens & Dorothy McBride
Stenton eds., 1996); Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutionalizing Abortion, in ABORTION POLITICS, supra, at
29.
154. Case, supra note 153, at 99.
155. Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights,
118 YALE L.J. 1394 (2009).
156. Id. at 1396.
157. Id. at 1402-03.
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the legislative level can better achieve the goal of establishing a positive network
of reproductive support for both men and women. 15
8
As opposed to Glendon and others, who grounded their critiques in a com-
parative legislative study of other Western countries, West's critique is inspired
by the general jurisprudence of "rights critiques." '159 She also advocates for a
critical evaluation of Roe v. Wade from a progressive and pro-choice perspective.
Similar to Glendon's argument and other previous arguments in favor of legisla-
tive solutions to abortion, West's declared goal is to secure women greater access
to legal abortion and to respond more broadly to their reproductive needs. 160
Moreover, it appears that two similar themes underlie this diverse body of legal
scholarship. The first theme challenges the wisdom of Roe's constitutional
rights-talk and judicially imposed approach to abortion regulation. The second
theme highlights the possible advantages for women and for reproductive justice
of resolving the abortion debate through a democratic process of political com-
promise at the legislature. The suggestion is that, if abortions were permitted in
the United States as a result of a democratic legislative process of deliberation,
conciliation, and compromise rather than judicial imposition of a strict concept
of rights, the conflict over abortion would ease and women would gain access to
publicly funded legal abortions. The Israeli case study, however, casts doubt on
these contentions and provides a more complex picture that reveals not only the
benefits of legislative compromises on abortion but also their potential harmful
implications for women.
B. The Nuanced Facts of Legislative Compromises
The most recent abortion statistics in Israel, published by the Ministry of
Health in December 2015, reveal that in 2014 98% of all requests for legal abor-
tions were approved by the Pregnancy Termination Committees. 161 The official
record indicates that, while the annual approval rate was slightly lower in the
early 1990s, this figure has steadily ranged between 97% and 98% over the past
fifteen years. 162 Moreover, additional data from other sources suggest that since
the enactment of the law, the vast majority of women who approached the Com-
mittees were granted permission to terminate their pregnancies.163 The approval
statistics of the Committees could explain why the terms of the abortion compro-
mise are still portrayed as beneficial for most women in Israel. 164 They might
also explain the relatively small body of critical commentary that deals with the
158. Id. at 1421.
159. Id. at 1398.
160. Id. at 1425.
161. Pregnancy Terminations by the Law, supra note 104, at 10.
162. Id.
163. Amir & Navon, supra note 85, at 55.
164. Morag-Levine, supra note 49, at 333.
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existing abortion legislation and the feminist reluctance to challenge the law or
promote alternative legislation.' 65 While commentators who addressed the issue
of legal abortion in Israel have been critical of the legislative history that gave
birth to the existing arrangement, most feminist scholarship in this area distin-
guishes between the restrictive language of the law and the practical reality in
which women have wide access to legal abortion. 166 The relative availability of
public funding further strengthens the tendency to describe abortion in Israel in
positive terms. 167 Additionally, in the Ministry of Health's 2015 official report
on patterns and characteristics of abortion approvals, Israel was ranked as having
a relatively low number of abortions per capita. Compared to EU countries, Israel
had the second-lowest percentage of pregnancy terminations per capita (after
Croatia).168 These figures together paint a positive picture in which almost every
woman who approaches the Pregnancy Termination Committee is granted per-
mission to have an abortion, and in which the country has simultaneously man-
aged to significantly decrease the number of abortions in comparison to almost
all EU countries.
However, as the previous Section of this Article reveals, the Israeli case
study deserves a more nuanced analysis. An attempt to evaluate the law's impact
on women by focusing on the Committees' approval of the vast majority of abor-
tion applications obscures part of the story. This focus disguises three addi-
tional-and crucial-aspects inherent in the existing legal arrangement. First, the
current regulatory regime and the scope of abortion approvals are not governed
by the law itself, but rather by enforcement mechanisms that were developed by
the law's enforcement agents but exist outside of the law. The intervention of
these agents-the Pregnancy Termination Committees and the Minister of
165. There are exceptions, of course. See, e.g., YISHAI, supra note 4; Amir & Shoshi, supra note
28; Amir & Shoshi, supra note 67; Morag-Levine, supra note 49; Rimalt, supra note 72; Rebecca Stein-
feld, Wars of the Wombs: Struggles over Abortion Policies in Israel, 20 ISRAEL STUD. 1 (2015). Delila
Amir and Niva Shoshi argue that two factors can explain the feminist reluctance to challenge the current
abortion law. The first is a sense that, at the end of the day, existing legislation is working and women
have significant access to abortion. The second is a fear of backlash once the issue of liberalizing abortion
law is raised. Amir & Shoshi, supra note 28, at 313.
166. For instance, Noga Morag-Levin distinguishes between Israel's "ad hoc liberal abortion poli-
cies" on the one hand, and its legal restrictions and public rhetoric disapproving of abortion out of religious
and demographic concerns, on the other. Morag-Levine, supra note 49, at 332.
167. For many years, public funding was available for medically necessary abortions, to women
who were victims of rape and to women under twenty or over forty. Women who did not meet these
criteria had to pay for their legal abortions even when performed in a public hospital. In private hospitals,
women have always had to pay for all types of legal abortion. In 2014, the age cutoff for publicly funded
abortion was amended from twenty to thirty-three. Consequently, a greater proportion of pregnancy ter-
minations are now part of the package of medical services included in the "health basket" that is provided,
free of charge, to all Israeli citizens in public hospitals. This development caused one commentator to
characterize Israel's abortion law as one of the "world's most liberal." Debra Kamin, IsraelAbortion Law
Now Among World's Most Liberal, TIMES OF ISRAEL (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.timesofisrael.com/israels-
abortion-law-now-among-worlds-most-liberal/. For a similar positive portrayal of abortion policies in Is-
rael, see Yair Rosenberg, On Israel's LiberalAbortion Policies, TABLET (June 16,2015), http://www.tab-
letmag.com/scroll/1 91538/on-israels-liberal-abortion-policies.
168. Pregnancy Terminations by the Law, supra note 104, at 44.
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Health-in redrawing the boundaries of abortion regulation was prompted by the
lack of a guiding rights framework from which to derive the proper scope of
abortion approval. The absence of a clear concept of rights has rendered Israeli
abortion law unenforceable since it is simultaneously too narrow (with respect to
the rights and needs of women) and too broad (with respect to relevant interests
or rights pertaining to the fetus). Hence, the law-circumventing enforcement
mechanisms developed by the Committees in response to women's needs and by
the Minister of Health in response to interests of the fetus are a direct result of
unrealistic and unenforceable legislation that is devoid of any concept of rights.
In practice, this means that what appear to be legal abortions in Israel are in fact
illegal terminations of pregnancies.
The second aspect of the Israeli legal arrangement that is obscured by a pri-
mary focus on the high rate of approval pertains to married women, who are
forced to lie in order to request and obtain legal abortions. In the past, these lies
centered mostly on false medical claims portraying the pregnant woman as men-
tally fragile and therefore entitled to abortion based on the mental health ground.
Today, the path to legal abortion involves a public (and potentially extremely
shameful) declaration of adultery. True, many abortions that appear to meet the
formal criteria of law are publicly funded.169 However, public funding is depend-
ent on abortion approval that meets a formal criterion enumerated by law. In the
absence of legal, socioeconomic grounds for abortion approval, and in light of
the fact that most women seek to terminate unintended pregnancies because of
social and not medical or criminal reasons, often the only way for a married
woman to receive a publicly funded legal abortion is to stand before a three-
person Pregnancy Termination Committee and falsely present herself as an adul-
terer. Such a declaration is not only degrading, but it also carries potentially
harmful consequences for these women in the future, particularly in divorce
cases. 170
In addition, married women continue to make false claims regarding their
mental states as an alternative route to obtain approval for a legal abortion. As
discussed earlier, the relatively high number of abortions performed based on the
women's health ground indicates that married women seeking to terminate an
unwanted pregnancy find some degree of refuge in this provision as well.1 71 Le-
nient policies employed by some abortion committees allow women to make
claims regarding their mental state without providing a formal psychiatric eval-
uation and in contravention of the Minister of Health's directive.
169. See supra note 167.
170. For example, in Jewish law, adultery constitutes a ground for divorce and may be a factor in
property settlements, child custody decisions, and the denial of alimony. See generally Pascale Fournier,
Pascal McDougall & Merissa Lichtsztral, Secular Rights and Religious Wrongs? Family Law, Religion
and Women in Israel, 18 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 333 (2012).
171. Supra notes 110-115 and accompanying text.
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Presenting oneself as "mad" or "bad" are therefore the most prevalent routes
for married women seeking a legal abortion. Both options are equally degrading
and potentially harmful. On the symbolic and practical level, married women are
denied agency, autonomy, and bodily integrity. Abortion is approved only if one
has been officially categorized as an unfit wife or an unfit mother. These catego-
ries can haunt women long after the abortion and lead to harmful consequences.
Moreover, within this culture of lies, women's access to abortion is not guaran-
teed and depends on the discretion of the abortion committees that have the sole
power to decide whether to accommodate or deny the reproductive needs of
women. Hence, public funding and access to legal abortion in Israel come with
a heavy price tag, one involving a process that undermines women's dignity,
autonomy, and equality.
Finally, the failure of the legislation is also reflected in the large number of
private illegal abortions performed in Israel annually. It may be safely assumed
that some unintended pregnancies eventually find their way to the black market
of abortion, as was the case during the period before the formulation of the ex-
isting abortion law. It is widely understood that Israel still has a significant black
market for abortions.' 72 According to one estimate, at 19,000 per year, the num-
ber of illegal abortions equals the number of legal abortions.' 73 The fact that doc-
tors are rarely prosecuted and illegal abortions flourish reveals the reality that the
legislation has ceased to matter, just as it did four decades ago, and abortion reg-
ulation itself is conducted in the shadow of the law. Moreover, illegal abortions
often require women to jeopardize their health and assume a financial cost con-
siderably higher than the customary cost of pregnancy termination procedures in
the public health system.
In sum, the democratic process of lengthy deliberation in the legislature,
which involved significant feminist compromises on the one hand and enjoyed
wide consensus on the other, has not produced workable abortion legislation. To
the contrary, unrestricted by judicial review or by the restraints of constitutional
rights, the majority of Israeli legislators were free to ignore the reproductive
needs and rights of women.
These insights regarding the failure of the Israeli abortion legislation provide
a concrete example of the potential limitations of a majoritarian legislative reso-
lution of the issue of abortion, especially when that resolution is not subject to
judicial review. They highlight the importance of a guiding framework of rights
for developing proper abortion policies and demonstrate how, in the absence of
clear rights-talk, majority rule can lead to the enactment of legislation that disre-
172. Statistics from a 2013 survey commissioned by the New Family organization in Israel support
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gards the rights, needs, and interests of vulnerable groups, such as women. Inter-
estingly, despite unique characteristics of the Israeli case study, other compara-
tive examples provide similar insights regarding the potential roles of rights,
courts, and legislatures in shaping proper abortion policies.
C. Adding a Broader Comparative Perspective
Over the years, numerous commentators have employed the tool of compar-
ative analysis to criticize Roe v. Wade's strict rights-based and judicially imposed
approach to abortion.1 74 Canada, Germany, and France are three prominent ex-
amples that have attracted scholarly attention as part of the effort to strengthen
the argument in favor of legislative, compromise-based solutions to abortion.' 75
It appears, however, that developments in the decades since many of these com-
mentators conducted their comparative analyses shed a different light on the sig-
nificance of the process that shaped abortion policies in these countries. An anal-
ysis of these developments provides some intriguing insights regarding the role
of the court and the role of the legislature in the process of legalizing and regu-
lating abortion. These insights are particularly important when analyzed along-
side the Israeli experience.
1. Canada
Abortion was decriminalized in Canada in 1988 as a result of the Supreme
Court's decision in Regina v. Morgentaler.176 The issue in Morgentaler was
whether the section of the 1969 Canadian Criminal Code pertaining to abortion
violated rights protected by the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
The statute in question, like the old British Mandatory law in Israel, had English
origins. It made abortion a criminal offense except in cases in which a therapeutic
abortion committee of three physicians certified that continuation of the preg-
nancy would likely endanger the life or health of the pregnant woman. The Ca-
nadian Court determined that the law and its therapeutic abortion committee pro-
vision violated the pregnant woman's right to security of the person, as
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in that it made
access to abortion contingent upon the vicissitudes of a committee's judgment.
This violation could not be upheld under "the limitation clause" in Section 1 of
174. See supra notes 142-154 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 3, at 15-22 (France), 25-39 (Germany); GLENDON, supra note
142, at 63-66 (Germany), 164-67 (Canada); see also Case, supra note 153 (discussing the benefits of
abortion compromises in Germany); Liviatan, supra note 153, at 391-95 (analyzing the benefits of com-
promises on abortion in France and Germany).
176. R. v. Morgentaler [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 32 (Can.).
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the Charter 77 because the means the legislature had chosen to achieve the objec-
tive of protecting unborn human life were deemed by the Court to be often arbi-
trary and unfair.
Morgentaler was decided on narrow grounds. Unlike the U.S. Supreme
Court in Roe v. Wade, the Canadian Supreme Court stopped short of striking
down the existing abortion legislation and left the legislature with wide latitude
to form a new system of abortion regulation. It acknowledged that state protec-
tion of the interests of the fetus "may well be deserving of constitutional recog-
nition under Section 1''178 and opened up the way for Parliament "to establish
either a standard or a procedure whereby any such interests might prevail over
those of the woman in a fair and non-arbitrary fashion."' 7 9 Hence, it avoided
imposing an affirmative rights-based outline for abortion regulation, instead em-
bracing the notion "that courts are not the appropriate forum for articulating com-
plex and controversial programmes of public policy."'1 80 At the time, it was plau-
sible to expect, as Glendon and others did, that the legislature would soon act
upon this judicial invitation to reconsider the question of abortion.'81 However,
the Canadian legislature has not been able to deal with this challenge. At the time
of decriminalization, Canada was governed at the federal level by the Progressive
Conservative Party. After Morgentaler, the Conservatives attempted to reintro-
duce criminal legislation against abortion; their effort failed. 182 Canada today has
no federal laws regulating or restricting abortion access.
In the absence of federal legislation, Canadian provinces and territories reg-
ulate abortion as a health care service.' 83 Lacking a guiding rights-based frame-
work for abortion regulation, the policies in the different provinces and territories
vary with regard to access and funding, resulting in an apparatus that makes abor-
tion inaccessible for many women.'84 For instance, abortion services were en-
tirely unavailable on Prince Edward Island until very recently and are very lim-
ited in several other provinces, creating lengthy wait times. 185 In some provinces
177. Section 1 states: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society." Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Con-
stitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
178. Morgentaler, I S.C.R. at 76.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 46. Studlar and Tatalovich characterized this aspect of the opinion as "a decision about
appropriate regulations, not constitutional rights." Donley T. Studlar & Raymond Tatalovich, Abortion
Policy in the United States and Canada: Do institutions Matter?, in ABORTION POLITICS, supra notel53,
at 75, 80.
181. GLENDON, supra note 142, at 165.
182. Joanna N. Erdman, In the Back Alleys of Health Care: Abortion, Equality and Community in
Canada, 56 EMORY L.J. 1093 (2007).
183. Id. at 1094.
184. Id.; see also Kerri A. Froc, Constitutional Coalescence: Substantive Equality as a Principle
of Fundamental Justice, 42 OTTAWA L. REV. 411,433-36 (2012).
185. For instance, in Manitoba two of fifty-two hospitals (4%) provide abortion services, while in
New Brunswick the figure is one of twenty-eight (4%), and in Alberta six of 100 (6%). Michelle Siobhan
Reid, Access by Province, ABORTION RTS. COALITION OF CAN., http://www.morgentaler25years.ca/the-
2017]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
and territories access to abortion is restricted by mandatory doctor referrals.186
Gestation limitations that restrict access to abortion vary significantly from one
province to another, ranging from twelve-week limits (in Yukon, Nunavut, and
New Brunswick) to twenty-four-week limits (in Ontario).' 87 Some provinces re-
fuse to pay for medical abortions (as opposed to surgical abortions),' 88 or for
abortions performed in a clinic and not a hospital, although most induced abor-
tions are performed in private clinics. 189 Despite decriminalization, new barriers
now impede access to abortion in Canada. These barriers are often the work of
bureaucrats, such as family doctors who refuse to provide referrals to abortion, 9 °
hospitals that do not provide abortion services,'91 or provincial governments that
refuse to publicly fund certain abortions.' 92 Abortion politics in Canada resemble
those in Israel in the sense that the frameworks of rights that determine access to
abortion are ultimately outlined by medical and administrative agents. The exact
scope and substance of a woman's access to abortion and the exact scope and
substance of state interests relating to the fetus are ultimately dependent on ad-
ministrative decision-making, not on a federal legislative or judicial concept of
individual constitutional rights.
struggle-for-abortion-rights/access-by-province/. On Prince Edward Island abortion services were not
available for almost thirty-five years, until the province government announced only last March that it
will finally move to provide such services. Sara Fraser & Jesara Sinclair, Abortion Services Coming to
P.E., Province Announces, CBC NEWS (Mar. 31,2016), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/prince-edward-
island/pei-abortion-reproductive-rights-1.3514334.
186. In New Brunswick, a woman needs two doctors to approve her abortion request; in the North-
west Territories, Yukon, Nova Scotia, and in some hospitals in Saskatchewan, abortion services are sub-
ject to a physician referral. On Prince Edward Island, until very recently women had to request a referral
from a physician to have their hospital abortion in another province covered by provincial health care.
Reid, supra note 185.
187. Id.
188. In Yukon, Nova Scotia, and Alberta, abortions induced by medication are not covered. Id.
189. According to the most recent statistics published by the Canadian Institute for Health Infor-
mation, more than half of induced abortions in Canada were performed in clinics (not hospitals) in 2013
(47,866 out of 82,869). Quick Stats, CAN. INST. FOR HEALTH INFO., https://www.cihi.ca/en/quick-
stats?xTopic=Hospital%2520Care&pageNumber-3&resultCount= 10&filterTypeBy=undefined&filter-
TopicBy=5&autorefresh=l. In provinces where abortion clinics exist, abortions performed in clinics sig-
nificantly outnumber abortions performed in hospitals. Id. Joanna Erdman explains that single-purpose
abortion clinics are widely held to offer "more supportive and higher-quality care" compared to hospitals.
Erdman, supra note 182, at 1095. The fact that some provinces do not have abortion clinics at all (Nunavut,
Yukon, Northwest Territories, Prince Edward, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan) or refuse to pay for abor-
tions performed in clinics (Nunavut, Yukon, Northwest Territories, Prince Edward, Nova Scotia, New
Brunswick, and Saskatchewan) creates a significant financial and geographical barrier for women seeking
abortion. Reid, supra note 185; see also Abortion Coverage by Region, NAT'L ABORTION FED'N CAN.,
http://www.nafcanada.org/access-region.html.
190. For instance, until recently on Prince Edward Island, few requests for abortion referral were
approved by the province physicians and most women had to pay out of pocket for abortion services in
another province. Reid, supra note 185.
191. Only 15.9% of Canadian hospitals provide abortion services. Froc, supra note 184, at 434.
192. See supra notes 188-189 and accompanying text.
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2. Germany
The German example further complicates the debate regarding the benefits
of legislative solutions to abortion. In 1974, the German legislature enacted the
Abortion Reform Act. 193 The new, liberalized statute provided that abortion
would no longer be punishable if performed by a licensed physician during the
first twelve weeks of the pregnancy and with the consent of the pregnant woman,
after she had received counseling concerning available assistance for pregnant
women, mothers, and children. 194 Three days after the enactment of the law, a
petition to the German Constitutional Court challenged its constitutionality on
the ground that it violated several provisions of the Basic Law, including its hu-
man dignity and right to life clauses. The Court struck down the proposed law
and determined that the German state was under an affirmative obligation to pro-
tect the constitutionally guaranteed right to life and human dignity of the fetus
by criminal means.195 The Court did not stop at striking down the proposed law,
as the Canadian Supreme Court did. Like the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade, the German Court went on to outline a constitutionally acceptable frame-
work for abortion regulation. Specifically, the Court pointed to four circum-
stances in which rights and interests of the pregnant woman were worthy of con-
stitutional protection and therefore justified providing some legal access to
abortion. These circumstances included medical risk (threats to the life or health
of the pregnant woman), criminal risk (when pregnancy resulted from a criminal
act), risk of fetal defect (a fetus suffering from severe birth defects), and social
risk (situations in which the continuation of the pregnancy would impose on the
woman exceptional hardships). The Court explained that in these circumstances
it was unreasonable to expect a woman to carry the pregnancy to term. Thus, the
1975 German Court decision was based on a strict, judicially imposed concept
of rights that disregarded the resolution of a majoritarian process in the legisla-
ture. The German Parliament complied, almost to the letter, with the ruling of
the Court, and the revised version of the Abortion Act that passed in 1976 re-
criminalized all abortions except the four judicially authorized categories.1 96
Interestingly, the German legislation enacted in 1976 in accordance with the
Court's guidelines resembled the Israeli abortion legislation formulated a year
later. Both laws granted women permission to terminate unwanted pregnancies
for reasons of social hardship in addition to the more traditional medical and
193. DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY 336 (2d ed. 1997).
194. The reformed law also provided that criminal penalties would continue to be enforced, as
before, with regard to abortions performed after the third month of pregnancy, except in those instances
in which medical, fetal defect, or ethical considerations would justify the termination of the pregnancy.
Id.
195. 39 BVERFGE 1 (1975) (Ger.), translated in Robert E. Jonas & John D. Gordy, West German
Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 605 (1976).
196. KOMMERS, supra note 193, at 347.
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criminal justifications. However, in Israel, where there were no safeguards for a
mandatory conception of rights, the legislature soon abolished the socioeco-
nomic clause out of narrow political considerations. In Germany, on the other
hand, despite the fact that the Court imposed a much narrower concept of
women's rights compared to the original abortion legislation, the final abortion
arrangement still secured for women the most important ground for abortion: the
socioeconomic ground. Data from the relevant period reveal that 80% of all legal
abortions fell into this category.'1 97 At the same time, even with its social hardship
clause, the German law was very narrow and therefore unrealistic in light of
women's actual needs. Like the Israeli legislation, it did not work as intended:
rates of criminal prosecution were low, and women who were determined to have
an abortion could travel to less restrictive jurisdictions. 198
Following German reunification, the abortion issue was revisited. In an at-
tempt to find a middle ground between the conflicting policies of East and West
Germany, the first all-German Parliament reached a compromise, passing the
Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act by a large majority.1 99 The new statute
departed from the Constitutional Court's earlier ruling in one crucial respect. It
decriminalized abortion in the first twelve weeks of the pregnancy and provided
that abortions could be performed during this period upon a woman's request
and after compulsory counseling and a three-day waiting period. This law was
soon challenged on constitutional grounds. In 1993, the Court issued a second
ruling on the proper constitutional boundaries of abortion legislation. 20 In its
opinion, the Court insisted on the revision of some features of the proposed law
to make it more protective of unborn life, focusing especially on the creation of
a refined system of affirmative counseling oriented toward preserving the life of
the fetus.
While declaring that mandatory counseling that encourages the woman to
continue her pregnancy could now substitute for criminal penalties during the
first trimester, the Court held that these abortions must remain illegal (although
not punishable). It also directed the legislature to adopt measures in all spheres
of law to support a woman's decision to favor life over abortion and to ensure
that child-rearing does not lead to disadvantages for women. Finally, the Court
held that abortions not justified on one of the four permitted grounds should not
be covered by the general public health insurance, but clarified that the State
could not constitutionally deny welfare assistance to poor women who wanted
such abortions but could not afford them. In rejecting the 1992 abortion statute,
the Court tossed the ball back to parliament. As in the 1970s, a pro-choice legis-
197. Id.
198. Id.; Case, supra notel53, at 96.
199. KOMMERS, supra note 193, at 348.
200. 88 BVERFGE 23 (1993) (Ger.). An official English translation is available at http://www.bun-
desverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/1 993/05/fs 19930528_2bvf000290en.htm.
[Vol. 28:327
When Rights Don't Talk
lature had to comply with judicially imposed constitutional guidelines that in-
sisted on drawing a different balance between the rights of the woman and the
rights of the unborn. A revised bill that provided for compulsory counseling for
non-permitted abortions, as outlined by the Constitutional Court, was passed by
the German legislature in 1995.2°1
German abortion law is often depicted as a compromise law that was crafted
by the legislature and the Court as equal parties to the deliberations. For instance,
following the first German Constitutional Court decision, Mary Ann Glendon
argued that the German Court, as opposed to the American Supreme Court, "left
the task of fashioning abortion regulation basically up to the legislature and the
ordinary political process." 20 2 Other commentators analyzing post-unification
abortion legislation have similarly referred to "compromise" as a key aspect of
the legal and political process that enabled the creation of contemporary abortion
legislation in Germany. 20 3 Indeed, the German Constitutional Court clearly ad-
justed its second holding on abortion to the needs of post-unification Germany
and outlined a constitutional framework for the regulation of abortion that was
different from the original outline. Moreover, it can be argued that the ultimate
scheme for mandatory counseling that was drafted by the legislature appears to
be less vigorous than what was intended by the Court. 2 4 However, a portrayal
of the legal developments that led to the formation of abortion law as a "compro-
mise process" between the Court and the legislature undermines the significance
of three characteristics of this process.
First, at the end of the day, it was a process in which the German Court
overruled a democratic decision reached by a more liberal legislature and ordered
the drafting of new abortion legislation based on ajudicially imposed conception
of constitutional rights. The fact that the legislature carefully followed the in-
structions of the Court might point to a political culture in which the authority of
the Court as the ultimate interpreter of the Basic Law is widely accepted, even
when a majoritarian process at the legislature reached a different decision. Sec-
ond, the ultimate judicial outline for abortion legislation was strictly rights-based
in a manner similar to Roe v. Wade, though different concepts of rights underlie
the two decisions. The primary distinction between the two legal systems is the
recognition of fetal life as an independent value worthy of protection under the
German constitution. To be clear, the German Court did not refer to the fetus as
a person and noted that it does not enjoy the same rights as other human beings.
201. KOMMERS, supra note 193, at 355-56.
202. GLENDON, supra note 142, at 65.
203. For instance, Ofrit Liviatan characterized legal developments in Germany as reflecting general
trends in many other Western European countries in which "legislatures and constitutional courts negoti-
ated over a long period of time and amid great public controversy uneasy compromises." Liviatan, supra
note 153, at 396; see also Case, supra note 153.
204. KOMMERS, supra note 193, at 355.
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This difference allowed the Court to strike a balance between the rights of the
fetus and the rights of the pregnant woman.
Finally, what makes the German example attractive in the eyes of many crit-
ics of American abortion politics is that abortion legislation in Germany provides
funding for most abortions, as well as positive assistance to families and children.
Yet this legislative scheme is based on a concept of positive constitutional rights
dictated by the German Court. As part of the duty to protect unborn life, the state
was required by the Court to protect families and mothers and to address the
problems and difficulties that a woman might experience during pregnancy and
child-rearing. In addition, in order to provide adequate protection for women's
constitutional rights, the State was obliged to provide welfare assistance to poor
women who were seeking to end an unwanted pregnancy and could not afford
it.2 °5 If public funding is available today for most abortions in Germany and if
the State also provides a comprehensive positive network of reproductive sup-
port, it is primarily the result of a judicially imposed concept of positive consti-
tutional rights that, in contrast to American constitutional law, interprets consti-
tutional values as imposing positive burdens on the State.
From an Israeli perspective, the German rights discourse and its impact on
the final boundaries of legal abortion are particularly revealing. In Israel, the ab-
sence of a conception of rights that determines the proper scope of legal abortions
contributed to the repeal of the socioeconomic clause, and to the formation of a
legal arrangement that is too narrow in light of women's actual reproductive
needs. In fact, following the repeal of the socioeconomic provision, Israeli abor-
tion law became narrower than the first constitutional arrangement formed in
Germany in the 1970s, which approved pregnancy termination based on harsh
social circumstances. German women enjoyed legal access to pregnancy termi-
nation based on social grounds as early as the 1970s, despite the German consti-
tutional acknowledgment of the fetus' right to life; in Israel, the dominance of
national and religious concerns and the absence of rights-talk led to the formula-
tion of an extremely narrow legal arrangement, which significantly restricted the
access of married women to pregnancy termination. In that respect, the constitu-
tional resolution of the abortion issue in Germany-despite its focus on the rights
of the fetus-led to the enactment of abortion legislation that better responded to
the needs of women than did Israel's conciliatory and rights-free legislative pro-
cess.
3. France
France provides another example that further complicates previous argu-
ments in favor of less rights-talk and more conciliatory deliberation in the legis-
205. Id.
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lature. In 1975, the French legislature reformed abortion law, approving medi-
cally authorized abortions until the tenth week of pregnancy for women in "a
state of distress., 20 6 The French legislature refrained from clear rights-talk and
compromised on a vague formulation of "distress" as the only reason for non-
medically necessary abortion. This was described as a "humane" solution that in
practice would make abortion a readily available procedure for French
women.2 7 The argument was that this formula was a satisfactory compromise
because it left the determination as to the existence of distress in the hands of the
woman. However, in light of the Israeli experience, it can be assumed that this
legal structure encouraged women to lie about their condition and encouraged
doctors who were concerned about women's access to safe abortions not to in-
quire about women's true reasons for pregnancy termination.
The Israeli case study demonstrates that legislation that is too narrow in light
of women's reproductive needs and rights ceases to matter practically, and that
the actual mechanisms for abortion approval are implemented parallel to the law
rather than within it. These insights might suggest that what made abortion a
readily available procedure for French women was not the orderly enforcement
of the law's provisions, but rather circumvention routes that evolved in the
shadow of the law. Mary Ann Glendon implicitly admitted that this might be the
case when she noted that "there are no sanctions against the woman who pretends
to be in distress." 20 8 This more nuanced reading of the reality of abortion access
in France after 1975 might help explain more recent events.
In 2014, the French legislature enacted a new piece of abortion legislation
that allowed women to have abortions during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy
with no questions asked, as part of a sweeping and historic legislative reform
meant to increase gender equality in the country.20 9 This reform supplemented
2013 legislation that required the government to cover the full cost of legal abor-
tions for every woman seeking such services, as well as contraception for ado-
lescent girls.210 Both initiatives were presented by the legislature as designed to
strengthen reproductive rights and health care. The shift to a clear discourse of
rights is apparent in the language of the new legislation. The new abortion law
206. Liviatan, supra note 153, at 392. The law, which was to expire after five years, was reenacted
with minor changes in 1979 after France's highest constitutional authority ruled that it did not violate any
constitutional texts. See GLENDON, supra note 3, at 18.
207. GLENDON, supra note 3, at 18; Liviatan, supra note 153, at 392.
208. GLENDON, supra note 3, at 16-17.
209. Loi 2014-873 du 4 aoat 2014 pour 1'6galit6 r6elle entre les femmes et les homes [Law 2014-
873 of Aug. 4, 2014 For the Real Equality Between Women and Men], Journal Officiel de la R&
publique FRANCAISE [JO.] [Official Gazette of France], Aug.4, 2014, p. 12949. For an English translation
of the abortion provisions, see THE WORLD'S ABORTION LAWS 2015, CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RTS.,
http://worldabortionlaws.com/map/.
210. Le d6cret n' 2013-248 du 25 mars 2013 relatifA la participation des assures pr6vue A l'article
L. 322-3 du code de la s~curit& sociale] Decree No. 2013-248 of March 25, 2013, Relating to the Partici-
pation of Insured Persons Provided for in Article L. 322-3 of the Social Security Code for Expenses Re-
lated to a Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy and the Acquisition of Contraceptives by Minor, [Journal
Officiel de la R~publique Franqaise] [J.O.] IOfficial Gazette of France], March 25, 2013.
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was enacted as part of a comprehensive bill that explicitly strove to promote
greater gender equality in the public and private spheres.2 1 1 Under the abortion
provisions, a woman's right to abortion on demand is clearly articulated, and
there is also some reference to the rights of the unborn. An important legal de-
velopment that played a role in inspiring this abortion reform was a 2004 deci-
sion of the European Court of Human Rights, in which the Court declined to
recognize a fetus as a person under the European Convention and refuted the
claim that the fetus has a right to life. 12
Hence, as opposed to the 1975 French abortion law that avoided rights-talk
in facilitating women's access to abortion, France recently embraced a clear
rights-talk framework for abortion regulation. This has led to the enactment of
comprehensive legislation that not only specifically defines the rights of the
woman in addition to the rights of the unborn, but also better responds to
women's and men's broader reproductive needs.
CONCLUSION
In 1992, Israel enacted two new "Basic Laws" that address several important
human rights guarantees. 213 These laws were designed to eventually be codified
into a comprehensive bill of rights, and they are currently regarded as Israel's
"semi-constitution," granting courts the power to strike down any legislation that
violates the basic rights guaranteed by the two Basic Laws. However, according
to the Basic Laws themselves, legislation that was in effect before enactment of
these laws is immune from any kind of judicial review. This implies that the
abortion law enacted in 1977 will remain unaffected by this partial constitutional
revolution and by the newly embraced discourse of individual rights. Thus, the
historical compromise at the legislature that conceptualized access to abortion in
language devoid of any concept of rights affects the lives of Israeli women to
this very day.
The problematic implications of this situation are not easily discernible from
official data on legal abortion in Israel. At first glance, official statistics tell a
relatively optimistic story, depicting Israel as a country with a relatively low
number of abortions per capita, although almost all requests for pregnancy ter-
minations are approved by the Pregnancy Termination Committees. However,
this Article reveals that Israel's official statistics on legal abortion disguise a re-
211. The law provides protections for domestic abuse victims and supports gender equality in the
division of childcare and representation in politics. It also strives to promote gender equality in the work-
place by encouraging men to take paternity leave to care for newborns. Law For the Real Equality, supra
note 209.
212. Vo v. France, App. No. 53924/00, 2004-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 326.
213. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, SH No. 1391 (Isr.); Basic Law: Freedom
of Occupation, 5754-1994, SH No. 1454 (Isr.).
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ality in which the abortion law itself no longer regulates abortion approval. Ac-
cess to abortion is, in fact, determined by the law's two enforcement agents-the
Pregnancy Termination Committees and the Minister of Health-through law-
circumventing mechanisms. These mechanisms guarantee wider access to abor-
tion, especially for married women, but it is an access devoid of dignity. Married
women who want to terminate an unintended pregnancy must either lie about the
true reasons for requesting pregnancy termination in exchange for a safe legal
abortion, or find refuge in a private, unsafe, and costly illegal procedure.
Compared to American women, Israeli women are indeed better off in terms
of the availability of public funding for some abortions and the relative ease of
obtaining a committee's approval for a legal abortion. In an era in which Amer-
ican women, and especially poor women, still lack easy access to and public
funding for pregnancy termination, these practical benefits should not be
disregarded. At the same time, the hidden, often unnoticed, and highly gendered
costs of the Israeli abortion law provide a valuable starting point from which to
debate arguments in favor of legislative solutions to abortion that are not rights-
centered. Most importantly, comparative lessons from the Israeli case study as
well as from Germany, Canada, and France are particularly useful in drawing
attention to the significance of a rights framework for shaping enforceable and
just abortion policies. Some of these case studies suggest that judicially imposed,
rights-based frameworks for abortion regulation are optimal, as majoritarian pro-
cesses at the legislative level can result in policies that undermine the rights of
disadvantaged groups, such as women. The American experience with abortion
regulation exemplifies this insight. Other case studies highlight the prospect of
legislative solutions to abortion that are also rights based. All these comparative
examples indicate that when abortion rights don't talk, neither gender equality
nor gender justice can be fully realized.
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